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MChina's Changing Constitution*
Jerome Alan Cohed" *
In 1978, the People's Republic of China promulgated its third constitu-
tion since the communist revolution. In many respects, the new constitution
reflects the attitudes andpolicies of Peking's current leadershp. In this arti-
cle, Professor Cohen analyzes the changes wrought by the new constitution
in property relations, restraints on executive power, and the protection of
individual liberties by comparing it with its predecessors.
An organization must have rules, and so must a state. A consti-
tution is a set of general rules, it is the fundamental law. . . . Con-
stitution-making is a matter of science.
-Mao Tse-tungt
The most exciting current development in international business,
particularly in light of the United States' recent recognition of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, is China's sudden receptivity to enhanced con-
tact and cooperation with the capitalist world. Because of this new
trend, large numbers of western businessmen and their lawyers are ea-
ger to learn about law in the People's Republic of China. Peking's
present leaders, intensely pragmatic and determined to modernize their
country with foreign cooperation, recognize that they must now con-
struct a formal legal system to facilitate not only domestic transactions
but also transnational ones. They frankly acknowledge that China has
to start from scratch, by first erecting a constitutional framework and
* This article is based upon a lecture presented to the Northwestern University School of
Law on April 6, 1976, as part of the Julius Rosenthal Lecture series and is published simultane-
ously in the Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business and the China Quarterly.
** Director, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School; LL.B., 1955, Yale University. I
am grateful to my assistants Paul Theil, Peter Chan, and Jane Leifer for their valuable help in
preparing this study, and to Professor Harold J. Berman of Harvard University and Dr. Frank
Munzel of the Max Planck Institute in Hamburg for their stimulating comments.
I MAO TSE-TUNG, On the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China, in 5 SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 145-46 (1977).
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then gradually adding the other conventional indicia of a legal system
that give confidence to foreign traders and investors. This is why recent
constitutional changes in China are of considerable importance to those
who seek to do business with this country of almost one billion people.
In reviewing these changes the following essay sketches the political-
legal environment that will shape economic development during the
coming decades.
On March 5, 1978, the People's Republic of China promulgated its
second constitution in little more than three years and the third since its
establishment in 1949.2 What functions does a constitution serve in the
Chinese political-legal system? Is it a sham not worth the paper on
which it is printed? Is it an artifice of propaganda designed to impress
and mislead foreigners? Does it have a legal as well as political signifi-
cance? The 1954 Constitution was not revised for two decades. Why
then was its 1975 successor so quickly overtaken by events? What are
the differences among these basic documents?
BACKGROUND
Self-conscious constitution-making is a twentieth century phenom-
enon in China. To be sure, the succession of imperial dynasties that
ruled the country from the third century B.C. until 1912 had gradually
developed a large collection of sophisticated statutes that described the
structure, principles, functioning, and interrelationships of the various
agencies of the empire, and these were supplemented by customs, tradi-
tions, and precedents. Yet the type of single document charter of gov-
ernment that began to proliferate in the West after the American and
French Revolutions did not appear in China until the very last years of
the ailing Manchu dynasty. Then, in a desperate attempt to stave off
collapse, the Manchu Government, "more ancient and conservative
than any other living organization," 3 grudgingly announced that it
would introduce a western-style constitution and become a monarchy
of the parliamentary type over the period of a decade.
The Manchus appeared to accept the demands of reformers who
2 The full text of the new constitution is reprinted in the Appendix, infra at 112. English
translations can also be found in DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 125-72 (1978) and in PEKING REV.,
Mar. 17, 1978, at 5-14. An English translation of the 1975 version can be found in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1975) and in PEKING REv., Jan. 4, 1975, at 12. An
English translation of the 1954 document can be found in DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 131-63 (1955). The term "procuracy"
has been substituted for the less familiar and more awkward "procuratorate" in this article.
3 Wang, Law Reform in China, CHINESE SOC. & POL. Sci. REv., June 1917, at 13.
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wished to emulate Japan. That country had gained great strength as a
result of the massive changes symbolized by the Meiji Constitution of
1889,4 which had borrowed from Europe the forms of a conservative
constitutional monarchy. Japan had inflicted a stunning defeat in 1895
upon its traditional elder brother, China, had terminated the humiliat-
ing extraterritorial privileges of the western imperialist powers in 1899
and had defeated Imperial Russia in 1905. Some type of western con-
stitutionalism, if only of the rather undemocratic Japanese and Prus-
sian variety, seemed to China's reformers not only to symbolize
modernity and legitimacy, but also to hold the key to wealth and power
in the international society that had ended the isolation of the Central
Realm. The Empress Dowager herself was compelled by circum-
stances to cry, "Our hope too is in a constitution."5
The process of constitution-building had indeed begun. Yet
before long, the disappointed reformers noted that "while promising
lavishly the Government was steadily concentrating power in the hands
of the royal family. Autocracy grew while constitutionalism was held
up as the prize.' 6 Because the Manchus kept the promise to the ear but
broke it to the hope, failing to move ahead even with the modest inno-
vations that had been contemplated, unsuccessful reform turned into
successful revolution, and the Republic of China was born in 1912 with
the promulgation of a provisional constitution. 7
So much early republican energy was devoted to constitution-
making that in 1917 a leading western expert on Chinese constitutional
development wrote that "[o]ne is apt to get confused with the welter of
constitutions that have come and gone." 8 These efforts culminated in
the supposedly permanent constitution of 1923,9 a splendid document
that was wholly out of touch with Chinese realities and was promul-
gated by the government of President Ts'ao K'un, whose writ did not
run far beyond Peking. The best that could be said for this document,
4 See G. BECKMAN, THE MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION, Appendix X (1957). See
also S. FuJiI, THE ESSENTIALS OF JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1940).
5 Bevan, China's Constitutions, CHINESE SOC. & POL. Sc. REV., Dec. 1917, at 92.
6 Wang, supra note 3, at 14. For English translations of the two principal documents promul-
gated by the Manchu government, the principles of Constitution (1908) and The Nineteen Articles
(1911), see L. TUNG, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 318-19, 320-21 (1964).
7 CHUNG-HAU MIN-KUO LIN-SHIH YUEH-FA (PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA). For an English translation of this document, see L. TUNG, supra note 6, at 322-25.
Literature on the Manchu flirtation with constitutionalism and its Republican sequel is extensive.
In addition to the other sources cited in this article, CH'IEN TAUN-SHENG, THE GOVERNMENT AND
POLITICS OF CHINA (1950) is an informative analysis upon which I have generally relied.
8 Bevan, supra note 5, at 90.
9 For an English translation of this document, see CH'IEN, supra note 7, at 436.
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which called for a western-style cabinet system of parliamentary de-
mocracy, was that it established ideals towards which warlord-ridden
China might one day strive. In reality it was largely intended for the
edification of the imperialist powers, which had promised to surrender
extraterritorial privileges once China adopted government and legal in-
stitutions familiar to the West.'0
Chiang Kai-shek's rise to at least nominal national power in 1928
led to further efforts to frame a constitution for the country. This re-
sulted in the provisional constitution of 1931,"1 which largely con-
firmed the existing arrangements which all government agencies were
controlled by the generalissimo's authoritarian Nationalist Party. The
provisional nature of this document and the domination of the Nation-
alist Party reflected the theory of Sun Yat-sen, who had prescribed that
a period of "political tutelage" should follow the Nationalists' military
unification of the country and precede the true constitutional era that
would unfold once the ways of democracy had been learned. 12
Nevertheless, before long, the continuing struggle for power led
various groups to demand promulgation of a permanent constitution,13
contrary to Sun Yat-sen's theory of the need for a period of tutelage.
During the next fifteen years, despite the interruptions required by the
war against Japan, enormous amounts of energy were lavished upon
what one close observer has called "the futilities of constitution-mak-
ing."14 We cannot consider here even a summary of those events, but
several points are worth noting.
One is that China's republican leaders frequently changed their
attitudes towards constitutionalism, depending upon their calculation
of political expediency. Thus, the successive draft constitutions often
differed drastically from one another. The ruling Nationalist Party
seemed especially ambivalent. It was reluctant to embrace constitu-
tionalism for fear of restricting its powers. Yet it was determined, if
there was to be a constitution, that the document should become a vehi-
cle for enhancing its rule by creating a strong executive that would op-
10 For a valuable, in-depth study of the political currents which shaped this document, see A.
NATHAN, PEKING POLITICS 1918-23, FACTIONALISM AND THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1976).
11 CHUNG-HAU MIN-KUO HSUN-CHENG SHIH-CHI YiUEH-FA (PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL TUTELAGE) of 1931. For an English
translation of this document, see L. TUNG, supra note 6, at 344-49.
12 CH'IEN, .supra note 7, at 296-303.
13 Id. at 317.
14 Id. at 308. For an intelligent analysis of some of the Kuomintang's early post-1931
dilemmas concerning constitutionalism, see L. EASTMAN, THE ABORTIVE REVOLUTION, CHINA
UNDER NATIONALIST RULE, 1927-1937, at 159-80 (1974).
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erate under form party control. Opposition leaders, intellectuals, and
others generally favored a permanent constitution in the hope of curb-
ing the increasingly dictatorial nationalist regime.
A second point to note is that all sides in the struggle to shape a
constitution tended to claim the mantle of Sun Yat-sen's ideology. His
ideas, however much distinctively blended, had come from the West.
Indeed, the impact of the West had left most Chinese convinced of the
superiority of western law and institutions and eager to apply them in
China.
Yet, from the earliest days of China's concern with constitutions,
some western scholars warned Chinese modernizers against importing
western institutions that did not suit the country's conditions and
looked forward to "the time when constitutions with a character of
their own will come out of the East."' 15 And, at least occasionally, the
Nationalist Party seemed to be searching for autochthonous Chinese
constitutional norms and forms that would be briefly and simply de-
scribed in a document intelligible to the people.
The Constitution of the Republic of China promulgated in 1946,16
which continues to prevail in Taiwan today, displayed major western
influences. Nevertheless, the presidential system that it prescribed also
reflected significant Chinese characteristics. For example, it grafted
onto the three branches of government familiar to the West two addi-
tional branches that have deep roots in Chinese history-the examina-
tion and control yuan.
Although the 1946 constitution is neither brief nor simple, it is an
impressive compound of East and West. Unfortunately, experience in
its application both before and after the flight of the Republican gov-
ernment to Taiwan in 1949 suggests that, like its predecessor, it has
made little difference in the nature and character of the Nationalist
Party's dictatorial rule. The organization and management of the party
remain more important than the formal structure and processes of gov-
ernment in the Republic of China. This is especially true because the
martial law that has continued to prevail on Taiwan since the commu-
nist victory on the mainland has resulted in suspension of certain con-
stitutional provisions and in party allocation of important aspects of
15 Quigley, The Constitution of China, 18 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 346, 350 (1924).
16 CHUNG-HUA MIN-KUO HSIEN-FA (CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA) of 1946.
For English translations of this document, see CH'IEN, supra note 7, at 447, and L. TUNG, supra
note 6, at 350-66. For an interesting discussion of this document by Dean Roscoe Pound, who
served as advisor to the Chinese Ministry of Justice, see Pound, The Chinese Constitution, 22
N.Y.U. L. REV. 194 (1948). See also W. TSAo, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN
CHINA (1947).
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state control to the military and security forces. 17
Until its decline imperial China had tended to display a high cor-
relation between the forms of power and its actual exercise; power had
been exercised by a small elite and had been rationalized and justified
on that basis. The influx of western ideas during the republican era led
to a yawning gap between, on the one hand, constitutional documents
that called for representative democratic institutions and individual lib-
erties and, on the other, a personalized party-military dictatorship
maintained over a non-western populace that was for the most part
poor, illiterate, disorganized, and impotent. In these circumstances
constitutionalism could not take root, and the documents that were for-
mulated could not lead to the stability for which their advocates hoped.
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1954
This background gives us some perspective on problems of consti-
tution-making in the People's Republic of China after 1949. As we
shall see, Peking's Constitution of 1954, although the charter of a revo-
lutionary system that was radically different from pre-1949 republican
regimes, nevertheless confronted similar problems and bore certain
general resemblances to its bourgeois predecessors.
Like its predecessors the 1954 constitution was essentially a foreign
product. Although it was not directly influenced by either Anglo-
American or Western European models, it was, nevertheless, a western
product because it was in large part borrowed from the Soviet Union
and the Eastern European people's democracies. However exotic these
countries may appear to Anglo-American or Western European eyes,
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies seemed western to the
Chinese. Indeed, many of the institutions and values enshrined in the
constitutions of the Soviet-bloc states are derived from the West.
The influence of the Soviet Constitution 8 was especially strong,
even though that document had been formulated to mark the Soviet
Union's entry into the socialist stage of development, while China in
1954 had not yet reached socialism but was at the earlier stage of a
people's democracy en route to socialism. Despite the consequent dif-
ference in state form between the "people's democratic dictatorship" of
17 Peng, Political Offenses in Taiwan: Laws and Problems, 47 CHINA Q. 471 (1971). This article
contains a detailed discussion of the consequences of the "state of seige" proclaimed throughout
the island on May 19, 1949 and that islstill in effect.
18 KONSTITUTSIIA (OsNovoI ZAKON) SOIUZA SOVIETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK
(CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS) of 1936
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as U.S.S.R. CONST.].
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the People's Republic and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that still
prevailed in the Soviet Union in 1954, the Chinese constitution re-
flected the Soviet model.
Like the Supreme Soviet, the National People's Congress, al-
though unicameral, became the highest organ of state power. Its
Standing Committee, like the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, was
expected to exercise effective legislative power between the infrequent
sessions of the parent body. The State Council, like the Soviet Council
of Ministers, functioned under the legislature as the highest state execu-
tive organ. Although the Soviet Union is a federal state while China is
not, the latter's local people's congresses and people's councils were
modelled on the local soviets and their executive committees in the so-
cialist republics.
In addition, the judicial system and the procuracy, a prosecutorial
institution that was supposed to have the power to investigate and pro-
test against violation of law by government agencies as well as by
others, followed the Soviet system. So too did the 1954 constitution's
long list of fundamental rights and duties of citizens parallel that of the
Soviet constitution. Finally, as in the Soviet-bloc countries, China's
courts were not granted the power to invalidate legislation on the
grounds of constitutional violation.
Thus we can understand why, in his Report on the Draft
Constitution,19 Liu Shao-ch'i, who later succeeded Mao as president of
the People's Republic, declared that the document was not only the
"epitome of the historical experience of Chinese constitutionalism" but
also a "product of the international socialist movement."20 The consti-
tutions of the Soviet Union and other socialist states had been widely
drawn upon as Mao himself conceded, even while contending that the
document "sums up [China's] experience in constitution-making since
the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty . ... 21 Moreover, as we have
seen, that experience itself had involved the assimilation of western
principles and institutions.
Few were surprised when the 1954 constitution was promulgated.
Once the initial years of upheaval, economic reconstruction, and con-
solidation of Party control had passed, it had been anticipated that a
formal constitution would replace the temporary documents of 194922
19 Liu SRAo-cHI'I, REPORT ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (1955).
20 Id. at 12, 20.
21 MAO, .rupra note 1, at 142.
22 The first plenary session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted
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and symbolize the new era of stability and economic growth. As in
other communist states and as in Republican China under the Nation-
alists, a government constitution was perceived to be a useful creature
of Party convenience. It established the basis for a strong, unifying
national government and allocated responsibilities among different
agencies, bringing greater clarity and order to a people who have al-
ways dreaded, and frequently experienced, political confusion. It also
confirmed, both at home and abroad, the legitimacy of a regime that
felt understandably insecure about its prestige.
This constitution, plainly a transitional document, set forth the
goals of a state that was advancing from a "people's democracy" to a
"socialist transformation" of industry, commerce, and agriculture. 23 As
Mao emphasized, it was designed to heighten the enthusiasm of and
unite the people by prescribing "a clear, definite and correct path to
follow . * "24 Indeed, one of its major uses was as an instrument of
indoctrination. Thus, in draft form, it was said to have been discussed
by over 150 million people and, following its promulgation, there was a
vigorous campaign to further disseminate and explain it to the masses.
Pamphlets, law reviews, popular magazines, and newspaper and radio
commentaries all elaborated upon the tasks prescribed and the terms
employed in the document.25 Of particular interest were discussions of
provisions that were ambiguous and appeared to reflect a political com-
promise that left the job of defining their meaning to the future. A
leading example was article 78, which stated that "[i]n administering
justice, the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law."2 6
The transitional nature of the 1954 constitution made it evident
that, once socialist transformation of the economy had been attained,
the Organic Law of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on Sept.
27, 1949. Two days later the same body adopted the Common Programme of the Chinese People's
Consultative Conference. For English translations of these two documents, see FUNDAMENTAL
LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 34-53 (Common Programme), 104-14 (Organic Law)
(A. Blaustein ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS].
23 See CHUNG HAU REN MIN KUNG HO KUO TI HSIEN FA (CONsTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA) of 1954, preamble [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as CHINA
CONST.].
24 MAO, supra note 1, at 145.
25 See J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1963:
AN INTRODUCTION (1968). For a bibliography of relevant English language material, see CHI-
NESE LAW, PAST AND PRESENT 49-55 (Lin Fu-shun ed. 1966). For a list of relevant Chinese
language periodical literature, see T. HSIA, GUIDE TO SELECTED LEGAL SOURCES OF MAINLAND
CHINA 261-65 (1967). For western analyses of the 1954 constitution, see Steiner, Constitutionalism
in Communist China, 49 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1 (1955), and Houn, Communist China's New
Constitution, 1955 W. POL. Q. 199.
26 For analysis of this provision and the struggle over its application, see Cohen, The Party and
the Courts- 1949-1959, 38 CHINA Q. 120 (1969).
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the document would be in need of revision. Yet socialist transforma-
tion came much sooner than many expected; it was substantially com-
pleted in agriculture shortly afterward and in industry and commerce
by the end of the 1950's. Late in 1958 Chairman Mao himself noted
this problem of constitutional obsolescence with specific reference to
the structural changes wrought by the people's communes. He asked,
"Has the [establishment of the rural] people's commune violated the
constitution? The issue of integrating politics and the commune, for
example, was not passed by the People's Congress, nor is it in the con-
stitution. Many parts of the constitution are obsolete ....
The "anti-rightist" movement that began in mid-1957 had already
virtually ended attempts to implement chapter VI of the constitution,
which dealt with the courts and the procuracy.2 8 As a result, it was no
longer feasible to argue against Party interference in the determination
of concrete cases as some courageous officials had done. Nor was there
further talk of implementing the rights enshrined in articles 75 and 76,
which entitled an accused to make a defense in a public trial before a
tribunal that included a judge and representatives of the people called
"assessors. ' 29
Of course, little effort had ever been made to implement some pro-
visions of the constitution. For example, during the spring of 1957,
during that brief, heady period when it was a Party policy to "Let a
hundred flowers bloom," a well-known Shanghai lawyer and journal-
ist, Ku Chih-chung, was one of many who assailed the Party for disre-
garding the constitutional guarantees of equality before the law,
freedom from arrest except with the approval of a court or procuracy,
and freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association.30
Actually, some legislative and administrative steps had been taken
to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest, but these had only proven
partially successful. 31 The Hundred Flowers period itself might be re-
garded as a limited experiment with free speech, but it was soon ended
by the "anti-rightist" campaign that was launched shortly after Ku
Chih-chung's speech. The Party struck back at its critics: "Ku Chih-
chung made a shameless attack on the Constitution. He will learn that
the Constitution protects the freedom of the People; but he will be dis-
27 1 MISCELLANY OF MAO TSE-TUNG THOUGHT, 1949-1969 (MAO TSE-TUNG SSU-HSIANG
WAN-SuI) 138 (Joint Publication Research Service Pub. No. 61269-1, 1974).
28 J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 14-18.
29 Id. at 430-35.
30 See INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, BULL. No. 20, TEIt YEARS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONSTI-
TUTION 22, 28 (1964).
31 See, e.g., J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 11-18, 25-35, 354-64.
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appointed if he hopes that the Constitution will protect the freedom of
speech, press and assembly of traitors, counter-revolutionaries and
rightist elements. ' 32 Ku and his ilk were plainly not considered to be
among the "People."
The Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, which was nothing less
than a disabling attack by Party Chairman Mao upon both the Party
and government organizations, left the remaining vestiges of the consti-
tution inoperative. This became evident when the President of the Peo-
ple's Republic, Liu Shao-chi, was stripped of his office even though the
National People's Congress, the only organ authorized to take this ac-
tion, had not met.3 3 Indeed, the failure to convene the Congress year
after year throughout the entire decade 1965-1975, despite the constitu-
tional requirement of annual sessions, was a glaring embarrassment.
As the terror of the Red Guards receded and the People's Liberation
Army restored order, pressures grew in many quarters for a new consti-
tution. Some groups hoped thereby to introduce a new era of stability,
civilian government, and greater protection for individual rights.
Others, particularly those who had improved their status during the
power shifts of the Cultural Revolution, wanted a document that would
take account of the vast changes that had occurred since 1954 and for-
mally confirm the altered political situation. Party Vice-chairman Lin
Piao and his followers were, of course, eager to use the occasion to
assure Lin's designation as Mao's successor and promote Lin's poli-
cies.3 4
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE 1970's
The draft of a revised constitution that was approved by the Party
Central Committee in 1970, but was not officially adopted, was a docu-
ment radically different from the 1954 constitution. It consisted of a
mere 30 articles and 2,000 words, instead of the 106 articles and 15,000
words of its predecessor. 35
Major internal changes occurred in China between 1970 and 1975,
including the death of Lin Piao, the purge of his followers, the rebuild-
ing of Party, government, and mass organizations under the increas-
ingly powerful leadership of Premier Chou En-lai, and the
rehabilitation of many veteran leaders, including Teng Hsaio-p'ing,
32 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, supra note 30, at 28.
33 See L. DITTMER, LIN SHAO-CH'I AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 94-109 (1974).
34 See THE LIN PIAO AFFAIR (M. Kau ed. 1975).
35 For an English translation of the revised draft of the Constitution of the People's Republic
of China, approved by the Party Central Committee on September 6, 1970, see THE NEW CONSTI-
TUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES 312-20 (M. Lindsay ed. 1976) [herein-
after cited as NEW CONSTITUTION].
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who had been dismissed during the Cultural Revolution. 36 Vast
changes also occurred in China's foreign policy and international
standing during that period. Yet the revised constitution that was
finally adopted in January 1975 in many respects followed the 1970
draft.37
To be sure, a number of significant changes had been made. It is
enough to note here, however, that the 1975 revised constitution elimi-
nated the 1970 draft's repeated references to "the great leader Chair-
man Mao Tse-tung" and dropped any mention of the dead Lin Piao,
whom the draft had identified as "Chairman Mao's close comrade-in-
arms and successor. ' 38 It also replaced "Mao Tse-tung Thought" with
"Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought" as the nation's theoreti-
cal guide.39 It added to the emphasis upon the leadership of the Com-
munist Party of China over the state. And, most importantly, it
inserted the crucial and unique provision that the chairman of the
Party Central Committee "commands the country's armed forces," in-
cluding the people's militia.40
A few months after the 1975 constitution's promulgation, a Chi-
nese diplomat asked me, in a tone that affected hurt, why the western
press had paid so little attention to this important event. In truth, the
western media had not given it the broad coverage that this document
might have inspired. Perhaps this reflected the widespread belief that
in China, as well as in other communist states, constitutions tend to be
worthless pieces of paper drafted by hypocrites. Moreover, the brevity
of the new constitution and its high slogan content, minimal statement
of goals and vague allocations of power only encouraged the cynical to
believe that especially in this case the mountain had labored and
brought forth a mouse. Only the Soviet propaganda mill-no stranger
to hypocrisy--devoted extensive coverage to the 1975 constitution, cas-
tigating it ad nauseum for its alleged violation of the principles of
36 See Rice, The SecondRise andFall ofTeng Hsiao-ping, 67 CHINA Q. 494 (1976); Starr, From
the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua Kuo-feng: The Signiflcance of the Colour of the
Cat, 67 CHINA Q. 457 (1976).
37 Some observers have stated that there was also a second revised draft adopted by the Party
Central Committee in 1973. See Gudoshnikov, Two Constitutions of the People's Republic of
China, 3 FAR E. AFFAIRS 72 (1975). Indeed, the Republic of China on Taiwan published an
English translation of what purported to be such a document. See BACKGROUND ON CHINA (Chi-
nese Information Service Pub. No. B.74-13, 1974); NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 321-27.
Yet two knowledgeable commentators have questiooned the authenticity of this document. See T.
HsIA & K. HAUN, THE 1975 REvISED CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2
(1975).
38 NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 35, at 314 (article 2 of the 1970 draft constitution).
39 CHINA CONST. of 1975, preamble.
40 Id. art. 15.
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Marxist-Leninist socialist legality.4'
What is particularly noteworthy is the fact that, apart from a na-
tionwide campaign to explain why the 1975 constitution proclaimed
China to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" rather than the "people's
democratic dictatorship" that the People's Republic had originally es-
tablished,42 the media in China devoted even less attention to the new
document than did the western press. There was virtually none of the
detailed exegesis of many constitutional provisions that had appeared
in books, magazines, and newspapers, and on the radio when the 1954
constitution had been adopted. Indeed, the exclusive emphasis on the
"dictatorship of the proletariat" suggested that at least those who then
commanded China's propaganda organs were not enthusiastic about
other aspects of the constitution. Further, Chairman Mao's highly-
publicized absence from the meetings of both the Party Central Com-
mittee and the National People's Congress that produced the constitu-
tion and his failure to endorse it, raised questions about its political
support.
When compared to its predecessor and to the fundamental char-
ters of other communist states, the 1975 constitution seemed a radical
instrument, despite the claim of then Vice-premier Chang Ch'un-ch'iao
that it was "the continuation and development of the 1954 Constitu-
tion."43 Yet in the context of Chinese politics it was the product of a
series of reluctantly made compromises between contending groups
that, for short-hand simplicity, we will call "radicals" and
"pragmatists." The former, often identified as "the Shanghai group" or
"Maoists", have been described as "fundamentalists who insist that
China must not sacrifice revolutionary values on the altar of economic
41 For an example of a more scholarly analysis of the 1975 constitution, see Gudoshnikov,
supra note 37. For an interesting commentary on a similar Soviet work, by an American expert
on Soviet law, see Hazard, .4 Soviet Modelfor Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 985 (1975). For the range of western analyses of the 1975 constitution, in addition to the
works cited elsewhere in this article, see Rowe, The PRC'S Constitutions and the Philosophy of
Constitutionalism, ISSUES AND STUDIES, July 1975, at 2-23; HsUeh, The New Constitution,
PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1975, at II; Tsien, Les Traits Particuliers de la Nouvelle
Constitution Chinoise, 1975 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 349; Munzel, Eine
Verfassung der Proletrarischen Diktatur, 4 WGO-MONATSHEFTE F6R OSTEUROP,.ISCHES RECHT
243 (1974).
42 See, e.g., Heng, Conscientiously Study the Theory of the Dictorshp of the Proletariat, PEKING
REV., Feb. 14, 1975, at 6; Szu, Historical Tasks of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, PEKING REV.,
Mar. 14, 1975, at 4.
43 CHANG CH'UN-CH'IAO, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, DOCUMENTS OF
THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA 36 (1975).
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development." 44 They have emphasized ideological purity and cultural
and educational policies that seek to transform the "world outlook" of
the masses. The latter, occasionally called "the Peking group", tend in
the short run to place rapid industrialization and economic develop-
ment before ideological orthodoxy and socio-economic egalitarianism.
They favor bureaucratic rationality and central planning over the mass
mobilization and decentralization preferred by the radicals, and they
stress educational policies that enhance professional, scientific, and
technical skills. Only with the greatest difficulty did these rival groups
manage to agree upon a document, and the one that they did adopt did
more to echo many of the developments of the preceding two decades
than to regulate the contemporaneous exercise of power or to specify
China's future tasks.
The dramatic events of 1976 that began with the death of Premier
Chou En-lai accelerated in April when the massive outpouring of senti-
ment to memorialize Chou turned Peking's Gate of Heavenly Peace
into the site of the most serious rioting the capital had witnessed in
many years.45 This led to the second removal of Vice-premier Teng
Hsiao-p'ing and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as premier, a hasty
appointment that was made without the approval of the National Peo-
ple's Congress, a requirement of the 1975 constitution.46 The death of
Chairman Mao in September, which precipitated the arrest of the lead-
ers of the Shanghai group, thereafter branded the "gang of four", led
many observers to wonder whether the triumphant pragmatists would
translate their victory over the radicals into a new government constitu-
tion, one that would eliminate the earmarks of the significant, albeit
,incomplete, influence that the radicals had exercised over the existing
document.
Following the Eleventh Party Congress of August 1977, which
promulgated a new Party charter as part of the effort to extirpate "the
poison of the gang of four," and the second re-emergence of Teng
Hsaio-p'ing, it became clear that another government constitution was
indeed on the way. Yeh Chien-ying, chairman of the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress, stated in his report on the
draft of the 1978 constitution that the smashing of the "gang of four"
marked the end of the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of a new
period of development that required a new fundamental law to meet its
44 Lieberthal, The Internal Political Scene, PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1975, at 1,
5-6. It is not clear to me whether Lieberthal's third group, the military, really constituted a coher-
ent category regarding the questions discussed here.
45 See New York Times, April 6, 1976, at 1, col. 6; PEINo REv., April 9, 1976, at 4.
46 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 17.
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needs. 47 Although the adoption of the 1978 constitution by the Fifth
National People's Congress did not stimulate an educational campaign
comparable to that of 1954, the gradually unfolding nationwide effort
to disseminate the new principles is proving to be considerably greater
than that of 1975. Nevertheless, even among the leaders of the
pragmatists' camp there appear to be varying degrees of enthusiasm
for, or at least preoccupation with, the 1978 constitution,4 the enact-
ment of which Yeh Chien-ying characterized as "a major event in the
political life of our people. '49
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1978
It is not possible here to scrutinize every provision of this most
recent constitution and contrast it with its predecessors. It is feasible,
however, to inquire briefly into three aspects of particular interest to
students of law and government: property relations, institutional re-
straints upon the exercise of executive power, and analogs to a bill of
rights.
Property Relations
Property relationships alone could not have provided an important
enough stimulus for enacting a new constitution, because in this respect
the pragmatists had been surprisingly successful in the 1975 constitu-
tion. Thus the 1978 version made relatively few changes.
According to Marxist analysis, the essential features of every soci-
ety are determined by its economic base, that is, its property relation-
ships.50 Because the People's Republic had virtually completed the
collectivization of the means of production in agriculture, industry, and
commerce by the end of 1960, 51 China had left the "new democracy"
stage of development and entered the socialist stage. Yet until 1975 the
constitution, the most obvious manifestation of what Marxists call the
superstructure, was not altered to reflect the major changes in the eco-
nomic base. As Yeh Chien-ying's report on the 1978 draft constitution
noted: "This great victory [socialist transformation] was already re-
47 YEH CHIEN-YING, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, DOCUMENTS OF THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 173, 176-77 (1978). See PEKING REV., Mar. 17, 1978, at 15.
48 See Socialist Legal System, China News Analysis No. 1123, June 16, 1978, at 4.
49 YEH, supra note 47, at 212.
50 K. MARX, Private Property and Communism, in KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 152-67 (T.
Bottomore ed. 1963).
51 Dutt, Some Problem's of China's Rural Communes, in CHINA UNDER MAO: POLITICS
TAKES COMMAND 119-43 (R. McFarquhar ed. 1966).
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corded in the existing [1975] constitution.' '52 Its property provisions
had belatedly confirmed the economic transformation.
In 1975 there was no longer a need to retain the 1954 constitution's
limited protection of capitalist ownership,53 because capitalism was a
thing of the past. Similarly, there was no need for further reference to
the peasant's right to own means of production.54 However, because
some individual working people in non-agricultural pursuits
-handicraftsmen and peddlers, for example-are still not collectiv-
ized, the 1975 constitution authorized the state to allow them to engage
in individual labor in ways that involve no exploitation of others, that
are within the limits permitted by law, and that are "under unified ar-
rangement" by basic level organizations. 55 The limited constitutional
tolerance of this vestige of the individual entrepreneur was balanced,
however, by the admonition that "these individual laborers should be
guided onto the road of socialist collectivization step by step."'56 The
new constitution retains this provision in substance and in almost iden-
tical language.57
The new constitution also reiterates its predecessor's statement that
"there are mainly two kinds of ownership of the means of production
...at the present stage."' 58 One is "socialist ownership by the whole
people," 59 that is, state ownership. The second is "socialist collective
ownership by the working people," 60 that is, collectively-owned com-
munes and other organizations. Presumably the phrase "at the present
stage" implicitly contemplates future evolution towards communism
through the transformation of collective ownership to state ownership.
The property provisions of the 1975 constitution had revealed
three clear instances of the influence of the pragmatists. In describing
the three-level ownership system that "generally" prevails "at the pres-
ent stage" in the rural communes, article 7 had noted that the produc-
tion team-the basic-leVel organization below the production brigade
and the commune-is "the basic accounting unit."'61 This gave consti-
tutional status, however temporary, to an arrangement that offers team
members a more direct financial incentive to be productive than if their
52 YEH, supra note 47, at 202.
53 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art 10.
54 Id. art. 8.
55 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 5.
56 Id.




61 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 7.
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efforts were submerged in the larger brigade or commune. Article 7 of
the 1978 constitution retains this language but adds-perhaps to show
the ideological orthodoxy of the pragmatists-that "[a] production bri-
gade may become the basic accounting unit when its conditions are
ripe." 62 Yeh Chien-ying's report notes that some brigades have already
become accounting units and urges "dynamic but steady policies and
steps" to encourage others to do so when the conditions are appropri-
ate.
6 3
The new constitution also retains the second of the pragmatists'
1975 triumphs-the provision that "commune members may farm
small plots of land for personal needs, engage in limited household
side-line production, and in pastoral areas keep a small number of live-
stock for personal needs." 64 However, in 1978 as in 1975 the proviso is
attached that this may only be done if "the absolute predominance of
the collective economy of the people's commune is ensured, '65 that is,
so long as the peasants do not neglect their principal labor on behalf of
the collective. Nevertheless, in 1975 this constitutional concession to
personal self-interest was surprising because of the bitter efforts of the
radicals to do away with such selfish practices in the past, efforts that
had been successful on a number of occasions. Now that the radicals
have been done away with, the provision has plainly been retained as
part of the programme for satisfying the peasants and stimulating their
production. The current version, by omitting its predecessor's addi-
tional condition that private production not hinder "the development"
of the collective economy, but only its "absolute predominance, '66
seems to give the peasants greater latitude than before.
During the euphoric days of the Great Leap Forward in 1958-59,
when the masses were mobilized in the hope of achieving utopian
goals, the commune was the accounting unit, and the farming of small
plots of land for personal needs and similar pursuits were terminated
and actually banned. Moreover, in some places individual incentives
were also blunted by a system of distributing food and other compensa-
tion to peasants without regard to the usual linking of income to the
number of work points an individual earned. The pragmatists won a
third victory in article 9 of the 1975 constitution, which repudiated this
visionary "free distribution" by flatly enunciating the classical Marxian
principles for the era of socialism: "He who does not work, neither
62 CHINA CONST. art. 7.
63 YEH, supra note 47, at 204.
64 CHINA CONST. art. 7.
65 Id.
66 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 7.
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shall he eat" and "from each according to his ability, to each according
to his work."67 Yeh Chien-ying's report on the 1978 constitution leaves
no doubt about the radicals' opposition to this provision:
The "gang of four" slanderously alleged that "to each according to his
work" is a capitalist principle. They attacked our system and policies of
payment for labour which embody this principle as the use of material
incentives as bait, and thus they undermined the application of this prin-
ciple, dampened the working people's socialist enthusiasm and disrupted
socialist production.68
Thus, for the present at least, constitutiondil blessing continues to
be given to the maintenance of income differentials based on individual
talent and effort. The attempt to enhance production by offering indi-
vidual material incentives would founder, of course, if people's earn-
ings, savings, homes, and other items of personal use were arbitrarily
taken away. Yet, despite the 1954 constitution's protection of "the right
of citizens to own lawfully earned incomes, savings, houses and other
means of life,"'69 confiscation occured in the countryside during the
Great Leap Forward of 1958-1959 and in the cities during the Cultural
Revolution.
The 1975 constitution retained the earlier document's protection of
individual ownership, but replaced the phrase "lawfully earned in-
comes" 70 with the narrower "income from work. ' 71 This seems to im-
ply disapproval of income earned by means other than one's labor,
such as from "fixed interest" that expropriated capitalists had been
paid as compensation for surrendering their property or dividends from
the investments in the People's Republic that overseas Chinese had for-
merly been induced to make. Article 9 of the 1978 version restores the
original protection. Presumably it represents a necessary reaffirmation
of the security of one's personal property as part of the effort to guaran-
tee citizens, including overseas Chinese, against a repetition of earlier
unfortunate events.72
This provision may only have credibility to the extent that the
67 Id. art. 9. These maxims are reaffirmed in CHINA CONST. art. 10. They appeared in article
12 of the Soviet constitution of 1936. The current Soviet constitution reiterates: "From each ac-
cording to his ability, to each according to his work." U.S.S.R. CONsT. art. 14. Similarly, the
concession securing the peasant's garden plot and related activities appeared in U.S.S.R. CONST.
of 1936, art. 7, and is retained in article 13'of the current constitution.
68 YEn, supra note 47, at 205. See PEKING REV., Mar. 11, 1978, at 24.
69 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 11.
70 Id.
71 CHINA CoNsT. of 1975, art. 9.
72 Article 54 of the new constitution specifically guarantees the just rights and interests not
only of "overseas Chinese," as in previous constitutions, but also of "their relatives," that is, those
actually residing in China. The Soviet Union has long struggled to define the boundary between
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state assures restitution or compensation to persons who have been
forced to yield their houses, household furnishings, bank accounts, or
other property. The fact that the 1978 constitution-while authorizing
citizens to complain against infringement of their rights73 -failed to
reinsert the 1954 document's provision for the state to make compensa-
tion for such infringement cannot be tremendously reassuring. 74 Nev-
ertheless, at various times during the past two decades, restitution or
compensation has been made to persons who have suffered property
deprivations,75 and the present government is taking further steps to
make amends.76
A principal satisfaction of individual property ownership, of
course, comes from the ability to transmit it to one's heirs. Yet the 1978
constitution, like its immediate precedessor, fails to retain the 1954 pre-
scription that "[t]he state protects the right of citizens to inherit private
property according to law."' 77 This is one example among many which
raises the question of what inference can be drawn from the failure of
the 1978 constitution to retain one of the 1954 version's provisions. As
we have seen, it would have made no sense to retain certain provisions
because events made them obsolete. There was apparently no need to
retain some other provisions because they were subsumed, in the inter-
est of brevity, under some broad phraseology of the truncated 1975 ver-
sion and even of the somewhat longer 1978 document. With respect to
inheritance, however, neither of these explanations seems appropriate,
and we cannot tell why the provision was not retained.
Does the omission of this provision mean an end to inheritance in
the People's Republic? Apparently not. That would be inconsistent
earned and unearned income, and article 13 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution maintains the distinc-
tion.
73 CHINA CONST. art. 55.
74 See text accompanying notes 154-75, infra.
75 See, e.g., E. VOGEL, CANTON UNDER COMMUNISM 279 (1969) (reports efforts in 1960-1961 to
make at least partial restitution or compensation to peasants for property seized from them during
the Great Leap Forward).
76 See Kirin Purges Gang Follower, Compensates Victims, Peking NCNA Domestic, April 28,
1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-84, May 1, 1978, at LI, L4 (states that property taken from
victimized persons was returned to them and that they were repaid wages which had been with-
held). Chinese media have shown increasing concern about property deprivations such as the
failure to restore to their owners houses that have been requisitioned for a long time by the mili-
tary. See Liberation Army Daily on Observance ofLaw, Discipline, Peking Domestic Service, April
12, 1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-74, April 17, 1978, at E6, E8. See also Shantung Provincial
Party Committee's United Front Department Sends a Letter to the Overseas Chinese ,4ffairs Office of
the State Council, Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), July 19, 1978, at 6 (recounts the two-year
efforts of government agencies to oust a resistant cadre from a house of an overseas Chinese that
he occupied long beyond his authorized tenancy).
77 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 12.
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with the steps taken to restore individual incentives. Indeed, in a major
article on the implications of the 1978 constitution for judicial affairs
no less a personage than Chiang Hua, president of the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court, stated that "[w]hen handling cases of inheritance disputes,
the courts must protect the lawful inheritance rights of the inheritors
designated by law and pay attention to protecting the inheritance rights
of juvenile and disabled persons. '78 It is possible that in 1975, as a
concession to the egalitarian sensitivities of the radicals, an agreement
was made simply to remove the institution of inheritance from view so
as to avoid the attention it would receive by continuation at the consti-
tutional level. If so, this was a modest enough concession in return for
their acquiescence in the constitutional vindication of the highly con-
troversial individual incentives. The campaign to elucidate the "dicta-
torship of the proletariat" that immediately followed promulgation of
the 1975 constitution seemed in part to be an attempt by the radicals to
prepare the ground for eliminating these so-called "Bourgeois rights,"
whose continuing existence fuels the fears of orthodox Maoists that
China may succumb to capitalist tendencies or Soviet-style income dif-
ferentials. The principal draftsmen of the 1978 constitution-the Polit-
ical Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Commit-
tee-undoubtedly gave some thought to reinstating constitutional pro-
tection of the right to inherit, but probably rejected this option as one
that was unnecessary to the perpetuation of inheritance and one that
would probably provide ammunition to critics eager to condemn the
post-Mao leadership for returning to the ways of the discredited "capi-
talist roader" Liu Shao-ch'i.
Restraints on the Executive
Although the 1978 constitution makes few changes in the 1975
document's treatment of property relations, it restores some of the insti-
tutional restraints upon the exercise of executive power that the 1954
constitution had provided for but the 1975 revision had omitted. The
1954 constitution was not based upon the separation of powers, but
upon the theory that the National People's Congress is the supreme
organ of state power.79 Thus it endowed the Congress and its Standing
Committee with a variety of powers that might have fostered the
growth of significant restraints upon the executive agencies led by the
78 Chiang, To Implement the New Constitution is the Glorious Task of the People's Courts, Jen-
min Jih-pao (People's Daily), May 23, 1978, at 3.
79 See CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 21.
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State Council.80 Unfortunately, efforts made to invoke some of these
powers in the mid-1950's proved abortive. Yet, in certain authoritarian
societies, constitutionally sanctioned agencies for restricting the execu-
tive have developed unanticipated significance. The gradual evolution
of democratic checks upon the executive following promulgation of the
Meiji Constitution in Japan offers a striking illustration."' Even com-
munist societies may witness the evolution of modest governmental re-
straints upon the executive, as suggested by the slow growth in the
Soviet Union of the role of the procuracy and the oversight functions of
legislative committees and, to a lesser extent, the courts.82 China's 1975
constitution represented an apparent design-agreed upon by both
radicals and pragmatists-to avoid that possibility. The 1978 version
reintroduces at least some potential checks upon executive action.
Under the 1954 constitution, the National People's Congress had
been granted the power "to supervise the enforcement of the Constitu-
tion" as well as to decide on general amnesties and questions of war
and peace.83 It and its Standing Committee also had been authorized
to "appoint commissions of inquiry for the investigation of specific
questions. ' 84 All state organs as well as people's organizations and
citizens had been "obliged to supply necessary information to these
commissions when they conduct investigations. ' 85 Moreover, Congres-
sional deputies had been given "the right to address questions to the
State Council, which are under obligation to answer."'86 And, in order
to protect these deputies against administrative retaliation, the 1954
constitution had provided that no deputy could be arrested or placed
on trial without the consent of the National People's Congress or, when
it was not in session, its Standing Committee.87
The 1975 constitution failed to retain any of these provisions, caus-
ing observers to wonder what inference to draw from that fact. It was
possible, of course, that all of them were omitted in order to produce a
succinct document and that they still could have been invoked under
the retained authorization for the Congress to make laws and to "exer-
80 The procuracy and the judiciary, organs which were responsible to the National People's
Congress, were also granted powers which could potentially have been used to restrain the execu-
tive.
81 See Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of.Japanese Law, in LAW IN
JAPAN 5-12 (A.T. von Mehren ed. 1963).
82 See H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 238, 299, 375 (rev. ed. 1963).
83 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 27.
84 Id. art. 35.
85 Id. (article 34 of the 1954 constitution also established various permanent committees).
86 Id. art. 36.
87 Id. art. 37.
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cise such other functions and powers as seems necessary. '8 8 One can
make a similar point about the failure of the 1975 constitution to re-
state powers that had been previously granted to the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People's Congress. It had been authorized-if we
list only restraints on the executive not mentioned in 1975-to super-
vise the work of the State Council, the Supreme Court, and the
Supreme Procuracy: to annul decisions and orders of the State Council
contrary to the constitution, laws, or decrees; to revise or annul inap-
propriate decisions of provincial governments, autonomous regions,
and municipalities directly under the central authority; to appoint and
remove the highest officials of the State Council except the premier; to
decide on state awards; to grant pardons; to decide, when the Congress
is not in session, upon declaration of war in certain circumstances; and
to decide upon military mobilization and enforcement of martial law.8 9
Perhaps the failure in 1975 to specify all of those powers could be com-
pensated for under the Standing Committee's continuing grants to
adopt decrees and "exercise such other functions and powers as are
vested in it by the National People's Congress." 90
Yet it seemed unlikely that such potentially important powers of
the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, impinging
as they might upon the highest administrative authorities, would have
been relegated to this treatment if the draftsmen had intended them to
survive under the 1975 constitution. Rather, it seemed probable that
the omissions were designed to make certain that the supposedly
supreme organ of state power, the Congress, remained passive before
the exercise of governmental power by its nominal executive agent. 91
Under the 1975 arrangements, of course, the Party's control over both
organs was enhanced by the exclusive power conferred upon the Party
Central Committee to propose to the Congress the appointment and
removal of the premier and the members of the State Council.92
The draftsmen of the 1978 constitution plainly did not think it
wise to perpetuate the doubts about the continuing existence of some of
the original powers of the National People's Congress and its Standing
Committee that had gone unmentioned three years earlier. In addition
to restating the Congress' power to decide upon questions of war and
peace, thereby reaffirming the legislative prerogative on a basic issue
that might otherwise have been thought to have been allocated to the
88 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 17.
89 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 31.
90 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 18.
91 See T. HSIA & K. HAUN, supra note 37, at 82, for a similar conclusion.
92 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 17.
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executive, they again spelled out congressional power "to supervise the
enforcement of the constitution" and actually broadened its supervi-
sory responsibilities by adding the phrase "and the law." 93 Although
the new constitution fails to reaffirm the power of the Congress or its
Standing Committee to appoint commissions of inquiry with the right
to compel those investigated to furnish necessary information, it does
reassert the right of deputies to address inquiries to, and to compel an-
swers from, the State Council and subsidiary agencies. 94 It places the
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuracy under
the same potential scrutiny.95 It seems doubtful, however, whether
these individual inquiries can develop into as potent a check upon the
executive as investigative commissions could, especially when the new
constitution fails to reinstate the 1954 constitution's protection of depu-
ties against arrest or trial without the consent of the Congress or its
Standing Committee,96 thereby suggesting the vulnerability of obstrep-
erous legislators to executive or Party retaliation.
Just as the 1978 constitution restores some of the checks upon the
executive that the 1954 document granted to the National People's
Congress, so too does it deal with the Standing Committee. Of the
Standing Committee's powers to curb the executive that were granted
in 1954 but unmentioned in 1975, three are not restored. The failure to
restore the powers to decide on military mobilization and martial
law97-however intrinsically important such powers might be in the-
ory-does not deprive the Standing Committee of instruments that
could have developed into effective controls over the executive. But
what can we say about the failure to bring back article 31(6) of the 1954
constitution, which authorized the Standing Committee "to annul deci-
sions and orders of the State Council which contravene the constitu-
tion, laws or decrees"? 98 In view of the fact that old article 31(7),
authorizing the revision or anulment of inappropriate decisions of local
governments, is restored,99 the intent of the draftsmen was obviously to
permit the Standing Committee to nullify the decisions of local govern-
ments but not those of the central authorities. Thus the Standing Com-
93 CHINA CONST. art. 22. The new provision makes no reference to a power to declare a
general amnesty, and there are other minor differences.
94 Id. art. 28.
95 Id. Article 27 also authorizes the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee to
establish special committees "as deemed necessary," and this provision could become the basis for
investigating committees.
96 CHINA CoNsT. of 1954, art. 37.
97 Id. art. 31.
98 Id. art. 31(6).
99 CHINA CONST. art. 25(5).
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mittee has been denied the most formidable weapon against the
executive, even though it has had some useful tools restored to it and
has been explicitly granted for the first time power to interpret the con-
stitution, not merely ordinary laws.100
Potentially much more important as a restraint upon the executive
than the new constitution's reaffirmation of certain powers of the Na-
tional People's Congress and its Standing Committee is its restoration
of the procuracy. The 1954 constitution authorized the Supreme Peo-
ple's Procuracy and its subordinate units to exercise "procuratorial au-
thority over all department of the State Council, all local organs of
state, persons working in organs of state, and citizens, to ensure obser-
vance of the law."' 01 Built along Soviet lines, but resting on China's
millenial tradition of the censorate as an institution for checking the
legality of bureaucratic and occasionally even imperial action, the
procuracy, designed to serve the People's Republic not only as a
prosecutorial agency but also as an independent watchdog of govern-
mental legality, is responsible only to the National People's Con-
gress-not to the central executive or local executive agencies and not
even to local people's congresses. According to the 1954 legislation that
implemented the constitutional prescription, the procuracy, although
lacking the power directly to annul or alter unlawful resolutions, or-
ders, and actions of state agencies, could request their correction and
protest against them. 102
The efforts of the procuracy to carry out its tasks were crippled by
the "anti-rightist" campaign of 1957-1958,103 and the Cultural Revolu-
tion administered the coup de grace to this organization. The 1975
constitution confirmed %the abolition; of the procuracy and transferred
its powers to "the organs of public security at various levels."" Thus
the police, originally one of the subjects of the procuracy's supervision,
became authorized to take on the responsibility not only for prosecut-
100 Id. art. 25(3). One should note that the power to annul illegal decisions of local govern-
ments that article 60 of the 1954 constitution conferred upon local people's congresses has not
been revised by article 36 of the current constitution.
101 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 81.
102 Organic Law of the People's Procuracies of the People's Republic of China arts. 8-9 (1954),
translatedin DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
LIC OF CHINA 206-07 (1955).
103 THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS 48-50 (R. McFar-
quhar ed. 1960).
104 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 25. There is some evidence that, even after promulgation of the
1975 constitution, certain procuratorial organs continued to function as separate departments
within public security bureaus. See Seikichi, The Judicial System Under the New Chinese
Constitution, 602 JURISTO (JURIST) 124 (1975).
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ing crimes but also for investigating the legality of their own actions as
well as those of other agencies. Moreover, unlike the procuracy, the
police were not independent of the executive but part of it and respon-
sive to its direction at every level of government. And, to make certain
that! the police had no illusions! about being able to exercise procurato-
rial authority independently, the 1975 constitution prescribed that
"[tihe mass line must be applied in procuratorial work and in trying
cases."'10 5 In theory, of course, this meant that the opinions of the
masses had to be consulted, but in practice the Party is the only author-
itative interpreter of the mass line's concrete content.
The 1978 constitution's restoration of the procuracy is its most sig-
nificant change. Yeh Chien-ying's report on the draft stated that this
was done "[i]n view of the extreme importance of fighting against viola-
tions of the law and discipline."'' 0 6 He reiterated what Peking media
had been claiming since the arrest of the "gang of four" 17 months
earlier-that Chang Ch'ing and her cohorts had "raved about 'smash-
ing the public security organs, procuratorial organs and people's courts'
and put their words into action ... ,"107 They had been charged with
terrorizing the populace and going so far as to exercise dictatorship
within the Party and the ranks of the people by arbitrarily arresting
large numbers of political opponents, confining them incommunicado
for years at a time, and subjecting them to endless "struggle meetings,"
midnight interrogations and other intimidations that coerced false con-
fessions and sometimes led to suicide and murder 0 They had also
been accused of unfairly dismissing hundreds of thousands of Party
members, bureaucrats, scientists, teachers, and others on the basis of
hearsay, speculation, and inadequate evidence without giving them an
opportunity for a hearing or review.10 9 Plainly, the demise of the
procuracy had not been attributable to the pragmatists, who brought it
back at their earliest opportunity. In their view,
[d]etention and arrests must follow legal procedures and the system of
checking and approval must be strictly observed in this regard. In the
trial of cases, stress must be laid on the weight of the evidence and on
105 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 25.
106 YEH, supra note 47, at 197. The restoration of the procuracy is but one of a number of
measures taken by the regime to increase the likelihood of discovering violations of law and disci-
pline. Other measures include revival of Party Discipline Commissions, renewed emphasis on
letters to newspapers and visits to government offices as important means of airing grievances, and
reestablishment of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee as a forum for discus-
sion and protests by intellectuals.
107 Id. at 197-98.




investigation and study. To obtain confessions by compulsion and then
give them credence is strictly forbidden. Only thus will it be possible to
protect the people effectively and strike sure, accurate and relentless
blows at the enemy, with the stress on accuracy."10
In reestablishing the procuracy the new constitution reinserts most
of the relevant language of the 1954 version. For emphasis, however, it
specifies that the procuracy is "to ensure observance of the constitution
and the law."' It also makes a more substantive innovation. It does
not revive the original system under which local procuracies were free
of all controls by local state organs and were responsible only to the
Supreme People's Procuracy in Peking and, through it, to the National
People's Congress.1 2 Instead it provides that local procuracies, like lo-
cal courts and revolutionary committees, will also be responsible to the
people's congresses at the corresponding levels and report to them. 113
Moreover, it gives local people's congresses at and above the county
level the power to elect and recall the chief procurator, as well as the
court president and revolutionary committee members, at the corre-
sponding level.' 14 It also authorizes deputies to the local congresses to
address inquiries to and receive answers from the procuracy as well as
the court and revolutionary committee at the corresponding level. 115
This new deference to grass roots control may have been adopted to
demonstrate a concern for democratic decentralization, permitting lo-
cal people to press the local procuracy to fulfill its functions even at a
time when the Supreme People's Procuracy may not be directing its
subordinate units to do their job. Yet the change makes it equally pos-
sible for local forces to press the local procuracy not to do its job,
whatever the orders from Peking are. That, after all, was the fear that
led to the original independence of the procuracy from local pressures
under the Soviet model. 116
110 Id.
111 CHINA CONsT. art. 43 (emphasis added).
112 CHINA CONST. of 1954, arts. 79 & 80.
113 CHINA CONsT. art. 43.
114 Id. art. 36.
115 Id. This power of local congresses to address inquiries to the procuracy, court, and revolu-
tionary committee of the same level is an innovation of the new constitution.
The National People's Congress Standing Committee recently adopted a decision authorizing
provincial revolutionary committees to select the chief procurator of the province when the pro-
vincial people's congress is in recess. NPC Standing Committee Holds Second Session 23-24 May,
Peking NCNA Domestic, May 24, 1978, summarizedin FBIS-CHI-78-101, May 24, 1978, at E12,
E13.
116 See J. HAzARD, SETTLING DISPUTES IN SOVIET SOCIETY 157-58 (1960). For recent com-
mentary on the Chinese procuracy, see T. HsiA & K. HAUN, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE PROCU-
RATORIAL SYSTEM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9-10 (1978). The failure of the new
constitution to restore to local people's congresses their earlier power to annul decisions of local
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In view of the control that the local Party committee would have
continued to exercise in any event over the procuracy as well as other
local law enforcement organs, we should not exaggerate the importance
of this innovation. Although the new constitution does not repeat its
predecessor's requirement that "the mass line" be applied in procurato-
rial work,"17 like its predecessor it makes clear at the outset that the
Party "is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. The
working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard,
the Communist Party of China."" 8 The procuracy can be no more
exempt from Party leadership than other state organs.
As we have seen, one of the major reasons for the restoration of
the procuracy was the need to provide some independent institutional
check upon detentions and arrests. Article 89 of the 1954 constitution
guaranteed the inviolability of the citizen's freedom of the person and,
to implement it, provided that "[n]o citizen may be arrested except by
decision of a people's court or with the sanction of a people's
procuracy."l 9 As in the Soviet Union, the constitution imposed no re-
straint upon the power to detain citizens, but the constitutional restraint
upon the power to arrest presupposed statutory requirements that the
police apply for an arrest warrant within twenty-four hours of detain-
ing a suspect and that the procuracy check upon police compliance. 120
The 1975 constitution retained the guarantee, but altered the im-
plementation clause to substitute "public security organ" for
"procuracy."' 2 1 Thus, instead of being required to obtain the approval
of either a court or a procuracy in order to obtain an arrest warrant, the
police had only to meet their own standards. That this was no mere
academic adjustment to the abolition of the procuracy for other reasons
is demonstrated by the history of frequent tension between the police
and the procuracy during the mid-1950's as a result of the latter's re-
fusal to approve arrests and prosecutions urged by the police.122 In-
deed, the procuracy's stubborn manifestations of a so-called "favor the
defendant" mentality that emphasized "trivial legal procedures and the
governments suggests that the drafters were not unduly concerned with establishing grass roots
control over local executive agencies. See note 100, supra.
117 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 25.
118 CHINA CONsT. art. 2.
119 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 89.
120 See Arrest and Dentention Act of the People's Republic of China art. 7 (1954), translated in
J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 360-62, 386, 584-85. For an analysis of the Soviet model of this
scheme, see H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 10, 52-53 (2d ed. 1972).
121 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 28.
122 See J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 15.
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rights and status of the criminal" 1 23 led to the attack upon it during the
anti-rightist campaign and to its subsequent demise during the Cultural
Revolution.
The 1978 constitution reverts to the wording. of the 1954 ver-
sion-that "[n]o citizen may be arrested except by decision of a peo-
ple's court or with the sanction of a people's procuracy,"'124 thereby re-
establishing the procuracy's restraining role over the police in this re-
spect. The return of this provision also apparently implies the revival
of the Arrest and Detention Act that specifies detailed restraints upon
the police. 125 In January 1978, two months prior to enactment of the
current constitution, some High Court judges in Peking told me that
the rules prescribed in that legislation were already being observed
again, although they obviously cannot be followed to the letter until
procuracies are actually functioning.
Because the procuracy formerly handled far more applications for
arrest than the courts, the revival of its role in arrests could turn out to
offer a significant check upon the executive and protection for the indi-
vidual. We should recall, however, the history of the previous constitu-
tional effort to give full scope to the procuratorial organs. Originally
the police and the courts were designed to complement and restrict
each other. But the system of mutual restraints contemplated by the
1954 constitution and the implementing legislation was "simplified" by
the anti-rightist campaign, and the local territorial Party apparatus was
given firm control of the law enforcement process so that "the three
departments have become one fist, attacking the enemy even more
forcefully."' 126 Is this what Yeh's report on the draft constitution means
by its reference to "strengthening the unified leadership of the Party
and relying on the masses" while nevertheless giving "full scope" to
these specialized legal agencies that are still supposed to complement
and restrain each other?127 If so, the new constitution will prove disap-
pointing to many Chinese even after the procuracy becomes opera-
tional again. In other words, is the procuracy that is being revitalized
to be like that of 1956-1957 or that of 1958-1966? The answer will
123 T'an, Absorb Experience and Teaching, Impel a Great Leap Forward in Procuratorial Work,
CHENG-FA YEN-CHiu No. 3, at 34, 38 (1958) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as POLITI-
CAL-LEGAL RESEARCH].
124 CHINA CONST. art. 47.
125 Arrest and Detention Act of the People's Republic of China (1954), translated in J. COHEN,
supra note 25, at 360-62, 386, 584-85.
126 Chang, Smash Permanent Rules, Go 1,000 Liin One Day, POLITICAL-LEGAL RESEARCH No.
5, at 60 (1958).
127 YEH, supra note 47, at 197.
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make quite a difference in terms of the possibilities of limiting execu-
tive action.
To those who recalled the arbitrary actions of the Red Guards, the
people's militia, members of the People's Liberation Army, and others,
the now superseded arrest provision of the 1975 constitution was not
entirely meaningless, for at least it reasserted the illegality of arrests
made by groups or persons lacking the sanction of a court or the police.
Since the fall of the "gang of four," we have been treated to endless
harrowing tales of how the "gang's" minions in offices, factories,
schools, research institutes, and other organizations arrested, confined,
and abused large numbers of people without the approval of any law
enforcement agency. The 1978 constitution goes beyond either of its
predecessors in seeking to stop such actions by requiring not only that
an arrest be approved by a procuracy or a court but also that it "must
be made by a public security organ."'12 8 To be sure, if another Cultural
Revolution should occur, the new provision cannot be expected to offer
any more protection in practice than did the 1954 one. Moreover, the
new constitution, like its predecessors, is silent about "detention," a
term that, as we have seen, is understood to describe confinement for
only a very brief period, but that in practice has often amounted to a
much greater deprivation of freedom.
The 1978 constitution also reverses a few of the many changes in
the status and procedures of the courts that the 1975 constitution con-
firmed, thereby reintroducing at least the possibility that certain judi-
cial restraints upon executive action might develop. In view of judicial
practice since the anti-rightist movement of 1957-1958, there can be no
doubt that the failure of the 1975 document to include most of the basic
judicial provisions of its predecessor was attributable not to a desire to
save space but to reflect the actual situation. The power of the state to
work its will was enhanced by the omission of the 1954 constitution's
requirements that trials be held before "people's assessors," amateurs
who, in theory at least, might outvote the judge assigned by the state to
join them on the tribunals,1 29 that trials generally be open to the pub-
lic, 130 and that the accused be accorded the right to make a defense
against the state's accusations. 13' All of those provisions have been
reinserted in the 1978 constitution,1 32 but it is too early to know to what
extent they will be implemented in ways that will make public trials
128 CHINA CONST. art. 47.
129 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 75.
130 Id. art. 76.
131 Id.
132 CHINA CONST. art. 41.
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more than morality plays staged for the edification of the masses.
Some of the experimental public trials conducted during the 1950's
were genuine attempts to determine the degree of the defendant's guilt
and the appropriate punishment. 133 There were also many instances in
which courts dismissed or returned to the police and procuracy for fur-
ther investigation cases in which proof of criminality was insuffi-
cient-actions for which the judiciary was condemned and curbed
during the anti-rightist movement and the Cultural Revolution. 34
The failure of the 1978 constitution to reinsert the 1954 provision
that "[i]n administering justice the people's courts are independent,
subject only to the law"' 35 suggests that the courts are unlikely to pose
a serious challenge to the executive. The 1975 omission of that article
was far from inadvertent, for, whatever its intended meaning in 1954,
the provision was explicitly repudiated several years later. 36 Unlike
the 1975 version, however, the new constitution does not go so far as to
place the courts under formal executive as well as legislative controls.
In the 1975 version the courts were responsible and required to report
to, not only the people's congresses, but also "their permanent organs at
the corresponding levels." 137 Thus, the courts below the Supreme
Court fell under the jurisdiction of the local revolutionary committees
which under the new order serve as local people's governments. 38 In
1975 the "permanent organs of the people's congresses," that is, the
National People's Congress Standing Committee and the local revolu-
tionary committees, were also given the power previously enjoyed by
their parent congresses to appoint and remove the presidents of the
people's courts at their level. 139 The 1978 constitution releases the
courts from formal executive controls and restores the 1954 arrange-
ments.
Of course, there is no need for the courts to be placed under for-
mal executive control if they can be satisfactorily manipulated by the
Party. The anti-rightist movement made clear that the courts, having
refused to do the bidding of the police and procuracy on occasion, were
henceforth to be more compliant. To assure elimination of contradic-
tions between the courts and the other law enforcement agencies, it was
133 A. BARNETT, CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA 240
(1967).
134 See J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 13.
135 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 78.
136 See Cohen, supra note 26, at 141-47.
137 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 25.
138 See id. art. 22.
139 Id. art. 25.
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explicitly announced that the former as well as the latter would be con-
trolled by the local Party committee not only in matters of policy but
also in the handling of concrete cases. 140 The judiciary was to be the
Party's docile tool.
The new constitution does not spell this out in so many words.
Indeed, perhaps for cosmetic rather than substantive reasons, it deletes
its predecessor's requirement that "the mass line" be applied in trying
cases. Like its predecessor, however, in addition to omitting the previ-
ous guarantee of judicial independence, it provides for the Party's exer-
cise of leadership over the state, which includes the judiciary. 141 The
Supreme People's Court has the status of an organ separate from, but
subsidiary to, the National People's Congress-like the Supreme
People's Procuracy and the State Council. Like other state organs, it is
expected to "constantly maintain close contact with the
masses," 142"accept supervision by the masses,"' 43 and "practice demo-
cratic centralism,'"144 all of which are euphemisms that, at least until
recently, served to mask Party control. The status of the lower courts is
similar in relation to the local people's congresses and other state or-
gans; they too are under Party control.
One might argue that, because the National People's Congress
Standing Committee supervises the work of the Supreme Court as well
as that of other agencies, 45 because deputies are for the first time em-
powered to oblige the Court by answering inquiries, 146 and because, as
we have seen, the Court is responsible and reports to the Congress and
has its principal officers appointed and removed by the Congress and
its Standing Committee, 147 it would have been inconsistent on this
ground alone to retain the judicial independence provision. The con-
trols possessed by the local people's congresses over the courts at corre-
sponding levels could be cited in further support of this argument.
48
Yet similar legislative-judicial arrangements in the 1954 constitution
were not thought to be inconsistent with the principle of judicial inde-
pendence. It was not the legislature's general controls over the judici-
140 See Chang, These are not the Basic Princioles ofour Country's Criminal Litigation, POLITI-
CAL-LEGAL RESEARCH No. 4, at 77-78 (1958), Liu, Realizations from my Adjudication Work, Po-
LITICAL-LEGAL RESEARCH No. 1, at 48-51 (1959).
141 CHINA CONST. art. 2.
142 Id. art. 15.
143 Id. art. 16.
144 Id. art. 3.
145 Id. art. 25(4).
146 Id. art. 28.
147 Id. arts. 22(6), 25(7), 42.
148 See id. arts. 36, 42.
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ary that ran afoul of the principle but the Party's insistence on
determining the outcome of specific cases. Until the Party yirlds this
prerogative, as the Communist Party claims to have done in the Soviet
Union,149 the judiciary is unlikely to make a significant impact in re-
straining the executive or the Party.
Events since the adoption of the new constitution indicate that the
PAty has no intention of yielding this prerogative. At the Eighth Na-
tional Conference on People's Judicial Work held in April and May
1978, Chi Teng-k'uei, who is a vice-premier but was identified only as a
member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Cen-
tral Committee, emphasized that "[s]trengthening Party leadership over
judicial work and adhering to the mass line are the two fundamental
points in our experience in judicial work. They are also the sure guar-
antee of our success."'150 In a report to the conference, Chiang Hua,
president of the Supreme People's Court, echoed Chi's call, stating that
judicial work and the application of the mass line must be placed
"under the direct leadership of Party committees."151 Shortly thereaf-
ter, Chiang, while laying great stress on the need to improve judicial
procedures and act according to law, again insisted that "the mass line
under Party leadership" be upheld.152
To make certain that the courts remain responsive to the Party, the
People's Daily, in a major editorial on the new constitution and the
legal system, instructed Party committees at all levels to make neces-
sary changes in judicial personnel; they "should promote those com-
rades to leadership posts who have been tested in the struggle between
the two lines" and meet political requirements and "should remove
from leading bodies or transfer out of judicial organs unrepentant ele-
ments who have committed serious mistakes" and other political unre-
liables. "People's judicial organs are an important tool of the
dictatorship of the proletariat," the editorial stated, and like other law
enforcement organs, they must follow Party leadership and "actively
participate in the 'two blows' movement against the sabotage activities
149 See H. BERMAN, supra note 120, at 14; Sharlet, The New Soviet Constitution, PROBLEMS OF
COMMUNISM, Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 11-12 (the Soviet claim is treated cautiously).
150 Reportage on National Judicial Conference Held in Peking, Peking NCNA Domestic, May
27, 1978, summarizedin FBIS-CHI-78-105, May 31, 1978, at El, E2.
151 Id. at E3.
152 Chiang, To Implement the New Constitution is the Glorious Task ofthe People's Courts, Jen-
min Jih-pao (People's Daily), May 23, 1978, at 3.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 1:57(1979)
of the class enemies and the flagrant offensive of the capitalist forces
"153
Some recent provincial radio broadcasts shed even more sobering
light upon the role of the courts. They suggest that, since the fall of the
"gang of four"-not only before promulgation of the new constitution
but also subsequently-the Party and the police may have continued to
dispense criminal sanctions in some cases. Unlike many broadcasts,
which claim at least nominal participation of the judiciary, these re-
ports do not even mention the courts. Chinese newscasters have yet to
appreciate the irony of stories that tell how local Party committees, as
part of their efforts to publicize the new constitution, stimulate public
security bureaus, not the courts, to hold "public trials" of "typical cases
of undermining the socialist legal system."' 54
In addition to modestly endowing the legislature, the procuracy,
and the courts with certain theoretical powers to check the executive
agencies, the new constitution preserves the right of citizens to chal-
lenge arbitrary executive actions. The 1954 constitution had given citi-
zens "the right to bring complaints against any person working in
organs of state for transgression of law or neglect of duty by making a
written or verbal statement to any organ of state at any level."1 55
Moreover, to put some teeth into this provision, it had added: "People
suffering loss by reason of infringement by persons working in organs
of state of their rights as citizens have the right to compensation." 156
Unlike a number of other provisions of the 1954 constitution, this
one did not remain entirely a dead letter. Even prior to 1954 there had
occasionally been cases in which, following discovery of false arrest or
unjust conviction, the wrongfully accused person had been compen-
sated for the damage suffered under procedures prescribed by a decree
of the Central People's Government. 57 After enactment of the 1954
constitution a small amount of the annual national budget was set aside
153 People's Daily Editorial Hails Judicial Work Conference, Peking NCNA Domestic, May 28,
1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-106, June 1, 1978, at El, E2.
154 See, e.g., Cases on Infringing on Rights Noted in He/lungkiang, Harbin Heilungkiang Pro-
vincial Service, May 22, 1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-106, June 1, 1978, at L1; District in
Shensi Improves Public Security Work-Style, Sian Shensi Provincial Service, May 26, 1978, sum-
marizedin FBIS-CHI-78-106, June 1, 1978, at Ml, M2. Such efforts are to be contrasted with the
efforts of Peking media to emphasize the renewed role of the courts and formal judicial trials. See,
e.g., Shang-hai Resumes Open-Court Hearings After 10 Years, Peking NCNA Domestic, July 25,
1978, summarizedin FBIS-CHI-78-143, July 25, 1978, at G5-G6. Sydney Rittenberg, an Ameri-
can who has long worked for Peking propaganda organs, has suggested that their recent reporting
concerning the judiciary "was all pretty far from the truth." Mathews, American Reflects on His
Rise and Fallin China, L.A. Times, July 24, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
155 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 97.
156 Id.
157 F. MASAO, Chinese LegalAj.fairs (Second Discussion), in CHUGOKU NO HO TO SHAKAI (CHI-
China's Changing Constitution
1:57(1979)
for payment of such claims, but almost none were filed. According to
Chinese Communist officials, once the "judicial reform" of 1952 had
rid the courts of judges left over from the old society, there were few
erroneous judgments and thus few occasions for such claims. 158 Yet
this is plainly contradicted by information published in China which
reveals that erroneous criminal judgments were frequent. 159 Chairman
Mao himself, in his famous 1957 speech "Problems Relating to the
Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," admitted that
many errors had been made in the punishment of alleged counter-revo-
lutionaries.160
The reasons why the constitutional guarantee of making compen-
sation for state wrongs was rarely implemented seems to lie elsewhere.
For one thing, the attempts of many aggrieved persons to file com-
plaints and claims were frustrated by official refusal to process them.
Moreover, many persons were afraid to press their grievances against
state organizations because of the widespread belief that those organi-
zations would retaliate against them. In order to ease this fear, Lo
Lung-chi, one of the leading non-communist figures of the regime, sug-
gested during the Hundred Flowers period that aggrieved persons be
allowed to complain to a special organization that should be estab-
lished to investigate cases that had been wrongly decided during the
previous mass movements to suppress counter-revolutionaries and
other enemies of the state. He believed that enabling aggrieved persons
to take their troubles to an organization other than the one that of-
fended them would guarantee that people who dared to "bloom" and
"contend" would not be subject to attack and retaliation. 161 Finally,
many persons who did have the courage to complain against state ac-
tion did not seek or simply were not granted compensation, even if
other measures may have been taken to restore their status.
Although the widespread violations of human rights that occurred
during the Cultural Revolution were often committed by Red Guards,
NESE LAW AND Sociery) 47 (1960), translated in J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 583. For typical
compensation cases, see J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 574, 584.
158 J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 583.
159 See, e.g., Tung, Adjudication Work ofthe People's Courts in the Preceding Year, HSIN-HUA
PAN YUEH K'AN (NEW CHINA SEMI-MONTHLY), No. 15, at 10 (1956). There are, of course, many
current reports of the large number of erroneous judgments handed down during the decade pre-
ceding the overthrow of the "gang of four." See, e.g., Nanking Court Re-examines Appeals, Peking
NCNA Domestic, July 13, 1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-137, July 17, 1978, at E12, E13.
160 An English translation of this speech is given in COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959, POLICY
DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS 273, 290 (1962).
161 THE HUNDRED FLOWERS CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE INTELLECTUALS 48 (R. McFar-
quhar ed. 1960).
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factory workers, farmers, and others who were not state officials, such
persons frequently acted under official direction, and officials person-
ally committed many abuses against citizens. The Cultural Revolution
can only have increased resentment over the government's failure to
fulfill the constitutional promise of compensation.
Against this background it is interesting to note that the 1970 re-
vised draft constitution wholly omitted any reference to a citizen's right
to complain about and claim compensation for wrongs committed by
state officials. The reasons for the deletion of this provision are
opaque, but the radicals, including the Lin Piao faction, were riding
high at that time and, having authorized their own followers in the
police, the army, and other official agencies to commit all kinds of
abuses during the Cultural Revolution, they were undoubtedly hostile
to the reaffirmation of this right. Whatever the reasons may have been,
by 1975 a different situation apparently prevailed.
The 1975 constitution retained the right to complain against a state
official's wrong but did not include the right to compensation. 162 In-
stead, it provided that "[n]o one shall attempt to hinder or obstruct the
making of such complaints or retaliate."' 63 Again we cannot be sure
about the reasons for the change. The reappearance of the right to
complain may have been attributable to agreement between radicals
and pragmatists on the desirability of exposing the bureaucracy to nec-
essary and continuous criticism. Those leaders who doubted the wis-
dom of reendorsing the principle may have gone along with it in the
belief that it could not cause much difficulty in practice despite the pi-
ous admonition against deterring such complaints. After all, the de-
mise of the procuracy had eliminated the principal government
institution for the processing of complaints against the bureaucracy's
violations of law, and by dropping the right to compensation for harm
inflicted, the 1975 constitution deprived individuals of an incentive to
bring complaints against the state. The compensation provision was
probably eliminated as a concession to the radicals, perhaps to assure
their acceptance of the right to complain; they undoubtedly believed
that placing a money value on the loss of human rights was too bour-
geois to be tolerated. And many leaders may have worried about the
potentially huge financial burden that a constitutional right to compen-
sation would impose upon the state.
Plainly the complex problems involved in this area presented
China's current leaders with a genuine dilemma. In the 1978 constitu-




tion they devised a flexible and subtle solution, one that is progressive
and yet does not obligate the state to pay vast sums in compensation.
The first sentence of article 55 restates the previous right to file with
any government organ a complaint against a violation of law or neglect
of duty, but significantly broadens that right by including violation or
neglect not only by any person working in a government agency but
also by any person employed by what Peking's Foreign Languages
Press translates as an enterprise or institution. 164 The Chinese term for
"enterprise" (ch'i-yeh) has a commonly understood core meaning, gen-
erally connoting an industrial or commercial unit operating under gov-
ernment management, such as a factory or department store. Yet the
term "institution" (shih-yeh tan-wei, literally "operating unit") has a
meaning which is less clear. Undoubtedly it is intended to include
other units that are managed by the state, but will it be interpreted to
embrace the people's militia, groups such as the Red Guards, perhaps
the Communist Youth League, and possibly even the Party itself? A
foreign observer cannot define the ambit of this term, but can only
point out that the newly added words importantly, if imprecisely, ex-
pand the scope of the activities subject to constitutionally-protected
complaints by citizens. This addition, like the newly established rule
that arrests must be made only by a public security organ, probably
reflects the unfortunate experiences of many citizens at the hands of
persons who frequently were not officials of a government agency but
who often acted under orders from officials.
Although the new constitution does not restore the 1954 right to
compensation of individuals who have suffered loss as a result of in-
fringement of their rights by state officials, unlike the 1975 version, it
does not ignore the plight of individuals who wish to pursue remedies
for violations of their rights. The new constitution grants to citizens
"the right to appeal to organs of state at any level against any infringe-
ment of their rights." 65 Although we are not told the meaning of this
sentence or the policy underlying its insertion, several points about it
are worth noting. First, unlike the 1954 compensation provision it is
not limited to infringements by state officials. It would appear to be
applicable as well to all infringements covered by the first sentence,
which now includes the conduct of persons employed by any "enter-
prise or institution," however defined. Indeed, the second sentence
may be read literally, to go beyond those instances covered by the first
sentence and to apply to any infringements of an individual's rights,
164 CHINA CONST. art. 55.
165 Id.
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even those committed by persons not employed by state organs, enter-
prises, or institutions. Such a broad construction would make sense if
the new leadership is determined to protect its citizens against arbitrary
acts from whatever source. Thus, under this construction the state
would have the responsibility to stop infringements by persons such as
the militia, the Red Guards, or the Youth League or Party members
even if they are not included within the ambit of the first sentence.
A second point worth noting is that, unlike its 1954 predecessor,
the new provision does not limit relief to cases in which the aggrieved
individual can prove that he or she has suffered loss as a result of the
infringement. The only thing that need be shown is that one's rights
have been violated. This is no mere technical change because it per-
mits individuals to obtain government remedies before serious harm
has occurred or at least before damage can be proved, even if no dam-
age can ever be shown. For example, a member of a commune that is
illegally forced to contribute funds to a county project can presumably
obtain immediate relief. To take another increasingly important illus-
tration, although the 1978 constitution does not give individuals a right
to an unpolluted environment, it does provide that "[t]he state protects
the environment and natural resources and prevents and eliminates
pollution and other hazards to the public."' 166 If an environmental
right develops through administrative or judicial decision or legisla-
tion, individuals adversely affected by undue factory pollution may be
able to obtain immediate relief without proving damage.
A final point to note is that, by reintroducing explicit concern for
aggrieved individuals and authorizing them to petition government for
relief that will often plainly include compensation as well as other
measures, 167 the constitution has implicitly opened the door to awards
of compensation without obligating the state to continue an experiment
that may turn out to be enormously costly. It also forbids the suppres-
sion of complaints and appeals as well as retaliation against persons
making them. 168 And it takes on somewhat greater credibility from the
restoration of the procuracy, which is assigned the task of pursuing the
kinds of problems covered by article 55.169
Events since the fall of the "gang of four" suggest that this provi-
sion is likely to prove of greater practical significance than its predeces-
sors in enabling citizens to protect themselves against an all-powerful
166 Id. art. I.





executive. China is at present engaged in a veritable orgy of rectifying
injustices ostensibly committed not only by the followers of Lin Piao
and the "gang" but also by government personnel and even Party offi-
cials since the overthrow of the "gang." People with serious grievances
are being mobilized to air them through writing leters to, or by person-
ally visiting, government offices, thereby helping to implement the new
constitution. The "letters to the editor" columns of newsapers have
been revived in order to expose wrongdoing, and investigative report-
ing of various kinds of abuses and corruption has become prominent,
providing a valuable supplement to the efforts of Party and law en-
forcement authorities. Great effort is being made to convice people
that the regime will not tolerate suppression of complaints or retalia-
tion because of them, and cases in which officials and others have been
punished for such misconduct are well-publicized. Recognizing, how-
ever, that people still understandably fear retaliation, the People's Daily
has even encouraged accusations to the extent of acting upon anony-
mous letters, stating that "the masses, when reporting a case, may con-
sider it wise not to sign their names through fear of eventual
consequences." 170
Despite the fact that it is no longer constitutionally required to
compensate persons suffering loss as a result of infringements by state
officials, compensation has been made in many recent cases, for exam-
ple, by paying the lost wages of personnel who had been unfairly dis-
missed from a government research institute. 17t Typical of some recent
reports where Party and public security personnel were found to have
been victimized is the decision by the relevant Party committees in
Liaoning
that those who were persecuted to death are to be treated as persons who
died while carrying on public business, that those who were tortured and
became disabled are to be accorded proper arrangements for work and
livelihood, that those families, dependents and relatives who were impli-
cated in the cases must be properly treated and be freed from the influ-
ence of the cases, and that all fabricated slanderous materials must be
sorted out and burned. 172
Not a day goes by without the announced rehabilitation of large num-
bers of persons who suffered from false charges, including Yang Hsiu-
feng, the former Supreme Colirt President who was purged in 1967 as a
member of an anti-Party group.173 In effect, posthumous rehabilitation
170 This quotation is from the People's Daily, May 15, 1978, summarized in Socialist Legal
System, China News Analysis No. 1123, June 16, 1978, at 4.
171 See note 76, supra; Party Justice, China News Analysis No. 1121, June 2, 1978, at 4-5.
172 Shenyang, Fushun Committees Reverse Wrong Decision, Shenyang Liaoning Provincial
Service, May 28, 1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-107, June 2, 1978, at L4, L5.
173 Kyodo: Former Jurist, First Secretaries Reinstated, Tokyo Kyodo, Feb. 28, 1978, summarized
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has become recognized as a human right, accompanied by proper fu-
nerals and reinterment where necessary.
As Supreme Court President Chiang Hua has emphasized: "Fail-
ure to exonerate the victims of frame-ups and redress unjust verdicts
means continued encroachment upon the rights of citizens and infrac-
tion of the law."'174 Less legalistically, a provincial newspaper has
pointed out that if all persecuted comrades are rehabilitated and their
persecutors punished, "the broad masses of people will have outlets for
their feelings against those who oppressed them, and their revolution-
ary enthusiasm will be boosted .... ,,175 Whether the injustices suf-
fered by "the broad masses," and especially those- of the disfavored
classes, will be attended to as assiduously as those of the Party and
government elite remains to be seen, and we cannot be at all certain
that the current zeal for righting wrongs will apply to future infringe-
ments. Yet one cannot ignore the significance of what is taking place
for strengthening notions of legality and rights-consciousness in a land
where they have been in short supply, at least on the part of the govern-
ments.
Although the new constitution makes certain changes in the electo-
ral process, there is still no prospect that citizens will be able to curb
arbitrary administration by electing responsive representatives to the
people's congresses that are the nominal superiors of the executive. To
be sure, the new constitution retains the sentiment that "[aill power in
the People's Republic of China belongs to the people," 176 but its electo-
ral provisions, like those of its predecessors, depreciate this rhetoric.
The 1978 version returns to the electoral method adopted by the 1954
constitution-direct popular election of the lowest level people's con-
gresses and election of the superior congresses by the congresses below
them. 177 The 1975 version had simply provided that "[dieputies to the
people's congresses at all levels are elected through democratic consul-
tation," which presumably meant through Party-managed selection.178
in FBIS-CHI-78-40, Feb. 28, 1978, at D3. Yang was reinstated as a delegate to the National
People's Congress. There is, however, no indication of his return to the judiciary.
174 Chiang, To Implement the New Constitution is the Glorious Task of the People's Courts, Jen-
min Jih-pao (People's Daily), May 23, 1978, at 3.
175 Liaoning Daily on Need to Reverse Incorrect Verdicts, Shenyang Liaoning Provincial Serv-
ice, May 28, 1978, summarized in FBIS-CHI-78-106, June 1, 1978, at L4, L5.
176 CHINA CONST. art. 3.
177 Id. arts. 21, 35.
178 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 3. In his commentary on the 1975 constitution, Gudoshnikov
pointed out that the phrase "democratic consultation" was used to describe the process of selecting
delegates not only to the government congresses, but also to the Ninth and Tenth Party Con-
gresses. Under this arrangement, he stated, "the will of the electorate was not brought out, the
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The new version provides for election "by secret ballot after democratic
consultation," whether at the direct or indirect stages, thereby adding a
cosmetic touch. 179 And it eliminates the unorthodox provision of its
predecessor that "[w]hen necessary, a certain number of patriotic per-
sonages may be specially invited to take part as deputies."' 180
Of course, even under the 1954 constitution not every adult was
entitled to take part in elections. Feudal landlords and bureaucrat-cap-
italists were deprived of their political rights for at least a certain pe-
riod.181 The 1975 constitution enlarged the categories of disfavored
classes. In addition to what it described as landlords and reactionary
capitalists, two new groups were denied political rights: rich peasants
and "other bad elements."'18 2 The present constitution deprives land-
lords, reactionary capitalists, and rich peasants of political rights, but
treats "other bad elements" like other serious criminals rather than as
members of a class.183 Although it continues to guarantee the right to
vote and to stand for election to all citizens at least 18 years of age, like
its predecessors it excepts "persons deprived of these rights by law."'1 84
Protection of Individual Liberties
If the new constitution only modestly enhances the formal institu-
tional opportunities for confining executive power to the standards im-
posed by law, does it make many changes in the standards themselves?
Given the bitterness of the struggle against the "gang of four," the
enormity of the charges lodged against them, and the impressive meas-
ures adopted by the present leadership to undo their wrongs, one might
expect the constitution that celebrates their downfall to grant signifi-
cantly greater protection to human rights than its predecessor, which
was the product of compromise between the opposing lines. Yet, in this
respect as in others, the contrast between the 1978 and 1975 constitu-
tions is not as marked as might be supposed. There are two principal
reasons for this. On the one hand, the 1975 constitution, to a consider-
deputies or delegates being appointed by the corresponding local agencies ('revolutionary commit-
tees' or Party committees) following consultations with the centre." Gudoshnikov, supra note 37,
at 73. See CHUNG-KUO KUNG CH'AN TANG TI HSIEN FA (CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CHINA) art. 9, lth National Party Congress, translated in PEKING REV., Sept. 2, 1977, at
20 [hereinafter cited as PARTY CONSTITUTION].
179 CHINA CONsT. arts. 21, 35.
180 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 16.
181 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 19.
182 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 14.
183 CHINA CONsT. art. 18.
184 Id. art. 44.
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able extent, reflected the realities of the antecedent two decades of state
practice. On the other hand, it did not go as far as might have been
anticipated in eliminating the guarantees of the 1954 version, which
nominally enshrined classical western liberties as well as material facil-
ities requisite to their enjoyment.
One important illustration of congruence between the new consti-
tution and its immediate predecessor that reflects the practice of the
preceding two decades is the omission of the 1954 constitution's decla-
ration that "[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China are equal
before the law." 85 That declaration had seemed inconsistent with the
same document's deprivation of the political rights of feudal landlords
and bureaucrat-capitalists as well as with the realities of everyday life
in China. Its omission in the new constitution avoids any inconsistency
either with the continuing denial of political rights to "those landlords,
rich peasants and reactionary capitalists who have not yet been re-
formed"186 or with the preamble, which makes clear that "for the entire
historical period of socialism" there will continue to be "class struggle"
under the dictatorship of the proletariat. 187
This is a fundamental point of doctrinal difference between the
world's two leading communist parties. The Communist Party of the
Soviet Union long ago declared that socialism in that country had ad-
vanced to such an extent that class struggle had come to an end, that
the state had become "a state of the whole people" and that the dicta-
torship of the proletariat had fulfilled its historic mission. This sup-
plied the theoretical underpinning for the post-Stalin reforms
emphasizing greater legal guarantees of fair treatment for all citi-
zens. 188 Soviet critics condemned the 1975 Chinese Constitution for
proclaiming, a generation after the founding of the People's Republic,
the necessity of continuing the class struggle under the dictatorship of
the proletariat until the great but far-off day when true communism
dawns. 89
In China for a long time to come some citizens will surely be more
equal than others, and the new constitution does not try to hide this
fact. Yeh Chien-ying's report does not, of course, refer to the report on
the 1975 constitution by the now discredited Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who
had stated that "this principled stand" sharply differentiates China's
185 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 85.
186 CHINA CONST. art. 18.
187 Id. preamble.
188 See H. BERMAN, supra note 82, at 90; Hazard, supra note 41, at 991.
189 See Hazard, supra note 41, at 991. See also Gudoshnikov, supra note 37, at 73.
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revised constitution "from such fallacies as Confucious' 'benevolent
government' or the Soviet revisionist renegade clique's 'state of the
whole people.' "190 Yet the statement is plainly correct.
In explaining the constitutional denial of political rights to un-
reformed landlords, rich peasants, and reactionary capitalists-labels
that were attached at the time of the communist takeover a generation
ago and do not connote any current economic status in an economy
that has been collectivized for two decades-Yeh stated that "counter-
revolutionaries and other bad elements" are also subject to the same
sanctions, which include continuing dictatorship over them in the hope
of reforming those who have not committed crimes so heinous as to
warrant the death penalty. 91 The new constitution makes what Yeh
calls "[a]n important change" by adding to the groups it singles out for
punishment a new variety of "bad elements" called "new-born bour-
geois elements." 192 Yeh's definition suggests the breadth of this phrase:
It refers to those newly-emerged elements who resist socialist revolution,
disrupt socialist construction, gravely undermine socialist public owner-
ship, appropriate social property or violate the criminal law. Not a few of
the embezzlers, thieves, speculators, swindlers, murderers, arsonists, gang-
sters, smash-and-grabbers and other evildoers who have committed seri-
ous crimes and offences against the law and discipline or disrupted public
order in our socialist society belong to this new category .... 193
Of course, the categories of counter-revolutionaries and bad ele-
ments are, strictly speaking, not based on class at all but on alleged
misconduct either before or after the establishment of the People's Re-
public in 1949. Yet "bad" class background has frequently been a deci-
sive factor in law enforcement agencies' decisions to detain and punish
a suspect, despite Chinese commentators' occasional criticisms of such
"subjectivism" during the early years of the People's Republic.194
Although the current leadership has refused to abandon the dam-
aging labels, it has begun to demonstrate some sensitivity to the accu-
mulated grievances caused by these stigmas and their many
discriminatory consequences, which have been transmitted to the chil-
dren and even grandchildren of the disfavored. This seems to be why,
in describing the disfavored classes, the 1978 constitution uses the
phrase "who have not yet been reformed" rather than the phrase "for a
190 Chang, supra note 43, at 38.
191 YEH, supra note 47, at 200-01.
192 Id. at 199 (referring to China Const. art. 18).
193 Id.
194 See, e.g., Kuang, Overcome Subectdvist Ideology, Raise the Quality of In vestigation of Cases,
Kuang-ming Daily, April 15, 1957.
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specific period of time according to law" used by its predecessors.195
Yeh explained that:
[W]ith regard to those who after remoulding and education have really
behaved well, we should remove their labels as landlords, rich peasants,
counter-revolutionaries or bad elements and give them citizenship rights
with the consent of the masses on the basis of public appraisal and ap-
proval by a revolutionary committee at the county level. This work must
be done seriously, prudently and systematically under the unified leader-
ship of Party committees at various levels and in accordance with specific
policies. 196
The process of removing labels is not a new one in China, but this
high-level support should encourage officials to invoke it more exten-
sively. It is interesting to note that in listing disfavored groups neither
the new constitution nor Yeh's report mentions "rightists," the category
that lent its name to the 1957-1958 "anti-rightist" movement, which put
an end to the Soviet-style legal system that had been developing on the
basis of the 1954 constitution. A recent foreign press dispatch from
Peking, quoting unidentified Chinese sources, reported that, thanks to
the intervention of Party Vice-chairman Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the Party
Central Committee issued a decree shortly before the adoption of the
new constitution that granted a "general pardon" to most of the report-
edly 130,000 remaining "rightists" and even banned the use of the term
"rightist."' 197 The people who have at long last been rehabilitated had
suffered sanctions that included sentences to prison and labor camps,
"non-criminal" confinement, probationary supervision, loss of employ-
ment, and stigmatization. They are now said to have been accepted
back into normal social life and given employment. The removal of
the rightist label is interpreted to be part of the overall effort to forget
past political errors and unite as many people as possible in building
the nation. 198 Teng is also thought to be active in the effort to curb the
application and the consequences of other labels.
The removal of large numbers of damaging labels is sure to arouse
anxieties among ideologues about the impact on socialist society of re-
leasing such suspect persons from close supervision. Yeh's report antic-
195 Compare CHINA CONST. art. 18, with CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 14, and CHINA CONST. of
1954, art. 19. The English translations of the same Chinese phrase appearing in the 1975 and 1954
versions vary slightly. The quotation in the text is from the 1954 constitution.
196 YEH, supra note 47, at 200-01. China's English translation of this passage of Yeh's text
omits reference to "reactionary capitalists." The Chinese text simply refers to/an, which could
symbolize either reactionary capitalists or counter-revolutionaries. The translator chose the latter.
197 See Party to Drop Charges Against 100,000 Rightwingers, Tokyo Kyodo, May 17, 1978, sum-
marized in FBIS-CHI-78-96, May 17, 1978, at EI8-E19. One of those who benefitted from this




ipated this reaction, asking rhetorically: "What if some such persons
make trouble again after their labels are removed? Well, we will just
mobilize the masses to strike them down-and put their labels back
again." 199
Its failure to restore the general "equality before the law" clause
does not mean that the new constitution has gohe back on an earlier
insistence upon equal treatment for minority nationalities. Indeed, the
1978 version reinforces the continuing principle, that all the nationali-
ties are equal, by reinserting both the 1954 document's express prohibi-
tion of "[d]iscrimination against, or oppression of, any nationality" and
its authorization for minorities "to preserve or reform their own cus-
toms and ways." 20 0
The new constitution for the first time adds to the continuing gen-
eral principle, that women enjoy equal rights with men, the specific
prescription that "[m]en and women enjoy equal pay for equal
work." 20' Similarly, it stipulates again for the first time, that "[m]en
and women shall marry of their own free will," 20 2 a principle laid down
by the Marriage Law of 1950203 but now given constitutional dignity.
In view of the great pressure for late marriage, this latter addition is
especially interesting; it is balanced, however, by a new assertion that
"[t]he state advocates and encourages family planning. '20 4
The "equality before the law" clause was not the only right pre-
scribed in 1954 that, in the light of practice, the different draftsmen of
1975 and 1978 agreed should henceforth be omitted. Another unhyp-
ocritical deletion concerns the "freedom of residence and freedom to
change their residence" that citizens ostensibly enjoyed under the 1954
constitution. 20 5 In actuality, of course, an individual's change of resi-
dence has required official approval. Moreover, the government has
long imposed specific restrictions upon the ability of rural residents to
move into cities.206 Since 1968 it has also employed all the mass mobil-
ization techniques at its command to pressure well over twelve million
199 YEH, supra note 47, at 201.
200 Compare CHINA CONST. art. 4 and CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 3, with CHINA CONST. of
1975, art. 4.
201 CHINA CONST. art. 53.
202 Id.
203 Marriage Law of the People's Republic of China arts. I & 3 (1950), translated in FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 22, at 266, 267.
204 CHINA CONST. art. 53.
205 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 90.
206 See, e.g., Instructions of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the
State Council of the People's Republic of China Relating to Checking the Blind Outflow of People
from Rural Villages (1957), translated inpart in J. COHEN, supra note 25, at 287.
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"educated youth" to leave the cities for careers in the countryside.20 7
Many of these urban young people, unwilling to accept the difficulties
of rural life, have illegally returned to the cities without jobs or ration
cards, creating a grave social problem. In these circumstances one can
understand why constitutional draftsmen thought retention of the resi-
dential freedoms clause unwise.
The 1978 constitution also retains several of the 1975 version's
modifications of fundamental rights originally set forth in 1954. We
have already pointed out the new constitution's failure to restore the
right to compensation for wrongs inflicted by state officials and its re-
tention of the substitute 1975 principle of non-interference with the citi-
zen's right to complain against such actions. 20 8 Here we should note
that, while the 1954 constitution provided that the "privacy of corre-
spondence is protected by law, ' 20 9 both of its successors merely list
freedom of correspondence as one of the freedoms enjoyed by citizens
without specifying its nature.210 Omission of the word "privacy"
hardly appears accidental in view of the government's widespread
practice of opening mail and resorting to other means of infringing the
privacy of correspondence.
Another modest concession to practice that results in no change
between the 1975 and 1978 versions relates to religion. Although these
documents retain the freedom to believe in religion articulated in 1954,
they strike a more realistic note by adding the phrase, "and freedom
not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism." 21'
No concession to the real situation is made, however, by the reten-
tion in unmodified form-in 1978 as well as 1975-of the freedoms of
speech, the press, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration,
which were proclaimed in 1954 but which have never been consistently
enjoyed by citizens of the People's Republic. 2 12 One of the major un-
resolved puzzles of Chinese constitutionalism is to ascertain why these
freedoms continue to be asserted when to do so is contrary to the every-
day experience of the Chinese people. Would elimination of these
guaranties risk a propaganda attack abroad? Would it doom to failure
the Party's spasmodic efforts to win the loyalty of China's intellectuals
207 See Bernstein, Urban Youth in the Countryside- Problems ofAdaptation and Remedies, 69
CHINA Q. 75 (1977).
208 See text accompanying notes 162-69, supra.
209 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 90.
210 CHINA CONST. art. 45, CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 28.
211 Compare CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 88, with CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 28, and CHINA
CONST. art. 46.
212 See CHINA CONST. art. 45; CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 28; CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 87.
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who are essential to the country's modernization but who aspire to
greater freedom?
Yet does retention of these symbols also carry risks? At one end of
the spectrum there is the possibility of further enhancing popular cyni-
cism towards the government for not allowing the freedoms it pro-
claims. At the other, there is the risk that large numbers of people may
actually try to enjoy those freedoms and justify their conduct by invok-
ing the constitution as some did during the Hundred Flowers era and
others did during the turmoil of recent years. After a generation of
experience, however, the Party leaders probably still believe it unlikely
that either of these risks is as great as the risk of immediate embarrass-
ment that would be created by failing to reassert the freedoms in ques-
tion.
Even more interesting than the 1978 constitution's retention of
many of the freedoms continuously prescribed since 1954 is its reten-
tion of other freedoms first given constitutional status in 1975 and usu-
ally associated with the radicals. Because widespread labor unrest did
much to undermine China's production in 1974-76213 and because
many of those strikes were politically inspired by followers of the "gang
of four," one might have thought that pragmatic leaders, determined to
restore labor discipline and suppress the radicals, would have been ea-
ger to do away with the recently-enshrined freedom to strike that had
sometimes been invoked to justify the work stoppages.2 14 But, accord-
ing to Chang Ch'un-ch'iao's report on the 1975 constitution, freedom to
strike had been added at the specific request of Chairman Mao.2 15 This
made it very difficult in 1978 for Hua Kuo-feng to challenge this provi-
sion, because Hua's legitimacy as Party chairman rests upon his alleged
annointment by Mao. Mao's desire to grant constitutional protection
to strikes was not new. As long ago as March 1957, when the Hundred
Flowers campaign was gaining strength, Mao had said:
Strikes and boycotts are means of struggle against the bureaucracy. If we
do not allow these, I think it is no good. Although the constitution has no
provision regarding this, I think we should let people do it. This is not to
say that we advocate strikes and boycotts throughout the country. We do
not promote this. We advocate fighting against bureaucracy. We pro-
mote the use of criticism among people to solve problems. Is the strike a
sort of struggle? Yes, it is. When the use of struggle by criticism cannot
213 See MacDougall, The Chinese Economy in 1976, 70 CHINA Q. 355 (1977). But see Field &
Kilpatrick, Chinese Grain Production: An Interpretation of the Data, 74 CHINA Q. 369 (1978).
214 See CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 28 (establishing the right to strike).
215 CHANG, supra note 43, at 39-40.
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solve the problem, we must allow the strike to be used.216
Apparently in order to avoid inconsistency with the right to strike,
the 1975 constitution, unlike the 1954 version,217 did not declare that
citizens have a duty to observe labor discipline. The pragmatists could
not have been pleased with this further encouragement of chaos. Al-
though in the 1978 constitution they had to tolerate retention of free-
dom to strike,218 they balanced it by reviving the earlier duty of citizens
to maintain labor discipline, protect public property, observe public or-
der, and respect social ethics.219 Yeh Chien-ying's report focused atten-
tion on reassertion of this duty and quoted Mao's 1959 call for "unity
and iron discipline," which, he maintained, is the spirit embodied in
the new constitution.220 He did not even mention freedom to strike.
The pragmatists have also retained, albeit in abbreviated form and
in a less prominent place, the most distinctive contribution that the
radicals made to the freedoms listed in the 1975 constitution. Article 13
of that document, located in the initial chapter of general principles
rather than placed with other fundamental rights near the end as its
successor is now,22' had provided:
Speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates and writing
big-character posters are new forms of carrying on socialist revolution
created by the masses of the people. The state shall ensure to the masses
the right to use these forms to create a political situation in which there
are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both
unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness, and so help consol-
idate the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the state and
consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat. 222
This article, a long one for that succinct document, was no mere repeti-
tion of classical western liberties. Rather, it was the articulation of au-
tochthonous Chinese political techniques that were widely practiced in
the late 1950's during the anti-rightist campaign, the Great Leap For-
ward, and the movement to establish people's communes, and were
perfected during the Cultural Revolution. Despite its use of words that
suggest similarities to conventional freedoms, article 13 made clear that
216 MAO TSE-TUNG, MAO TSE-TUNG SSU-HSIANG WAN-SUI (LONG LIVE MAO TSE-TUNG
THOUGHT) 93 (1969).
217 Article 100 of the 1954 constitution had required citizens not only to uphold labor disci-
pline, but also to abide by the constitution and the law, keep public order, and respect social
ethics.
218 CHINA CONsT. art. 45.
219 Id. art. 57. Article 101 of the 1954 constitution had established the duty of every citizen to
protect public property.
220 YEH, supra note 47, at 191.
221 See CHINA CONsT. art. 45.
222 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 13.
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it was designed not to protect individual expression as much as to au-
thorize the masses to participate in the political struggle under Party
guidance as an instrument of consolidating Party leadership over the
state and the dictatorship of the proletariat.
In other words, just as the right to strike was perceived as a politi-
cal weapon for mobilizing the masses to intimidate the bureaucracy,
rather than as an economic weapon to achieve improvements in the
employment conditions of the workers, so too are these recently-
evolved political freedoms perceived to be tools of the Party which, at
least in theory, can never be separated from the masses. Of course,
those persons whom the Party classifies as enemies are by definition not
within "the people." Therefore they may not benefit from either these
new freedoms or the bourgeois freedoms to which the new freedoms
are now appended in the 1978 constitution, for they are the subjects of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. As the reports of both Chang Ch'un-
ch'iao and Yeh Chien-ying recognized, democracy is only to be prac-
ticed within the ranks of the people. The "gang of four" and their tri-
umphant rivals were at one in invoking Maoist theory about the
importance of correctly distinguishing between the two types of contra-
dictions: those "between the enemy and ourselves" and those "among
the people." They could also agree that the people could be defined as
"all who support socialism. ' 223
The problem, of course, lies in applying to concrete cases a stan-
dard that is so vague as to permit arbitrary manipulation against any-
one who disagrees with the current line. Mao himself conceded that "it
is sometimes easy to confuse the two types of contradictions. 22 4 Even
loyal Party leaders who oppose the will of whatever leadership faction
is dominant at a given time have often been declared capitalist roaders,
counter-revolutionaries, and enemies of the people. This, after all, is
the principal charge against the "gang of four"-that "[t]hey went so
far as to exercise dictatorship within the Party and the ranks of the
people." 225 And, of course, the present leaders are exercising dictator-
ship over the "gang" and what is usually called "the handful of their
unrepentant sworn followers." Rather than abandon Maoist theory,
the current leaders seek to benefit from their application of it. Thus the
new freedoms have been retained as part of this intellectual structure.
They will be enjoyed by those in favor with the new leaders to serve the
purposes of those leaders.
223 YEH, supra note 47, at 216.
224 COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-1959, POLIcY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS 279 (1962).
225 YEH, supra note 47, at 198.
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It is difficult to know how to characterize the new constitution's
reassertion that "[clitizens have the freedom to engage in scientific re-
search, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activities. '22
6
The identical 1954 provision227 had been deleted in 1975 and replaced
by a general principle that plainly reflected the impact of the radicals'
determination to perpetuate the Cultural Revolution:,
The proletariat must exercise all-around dictatorship over the bour-
geoisie in the superstructure, including all spheres of culture. Culture and
education, literature and art, physical education, health work and scien-
tific research work must all serve proletarian politics, serve the workers,
peasants and soldiers, and be combined with productive labor.
228
By in turn deleting this article and replacing it with its predecessor,
have the present leaders promoted freedom or acted hypocritically?
If we look only at the constitutional language, the former appears
plainly to be the case. Yet Yeh Chien-ying's report makes clear that
this seemingly absolute freedom is to be enjoyed only by those who
observe the "six political criteria.12 29 This is a short-hand reference to
Mao's famous 1957 speech that authorized only words and deeds that
help to unite people rather than divide them, that are beneficial and not
harmful socialist transformation and construction, international social-
ist unity, and the unity of peace-loving peoples, and that help to
strengthen and not to weaken the people's democratic dictatorship,
democratic centralism, and the Party leadership.230 Within these murky
limits that are susceptible of arbitrary manipulation, Yeh stated that
"different forms and styles in art should freely develop, different
schools in science should freely contend and questions of right and
wrong in the arts and sciences should be settled through free discussion
in artistic and scientific circles and through practical work in these
fields." 231
Yeh's invocation of Mao's six criteria makes the difference be-
tween the radicals' formulation and the constitutional prescription con-
siderably smaller than appears on the surface. Indeed, the 1975
language represents quite an accurate description of the current Party
line, even though as a factual matter much greater cultural, scientific,
and educational freedom exists at present than existed during the intel-
lectual nightmare of the decade 1966-1976. Just as the Party line dur-
226 CHINA CONST. art. 52.
227 CHINA CONST. of 1954, art. 95.
228 CHINA CONST. of 1975, art. 12.
229 YEH, supra note 47, at 211.
230 For a translation of the relevant portions of Mao's speech, see COMMUNIST CHINA 1955-
1959, POLICY DOCUMENTS WITH ANALYSIS 290 (1962).
231 YEH, supra note 47, at 211-12.
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ing that repressive era was more monolithic than the 1975 constitu-
tional provision made it seem, so too is the current Party line more
restrictive than the present constituional provision would suggest. Nev-
ertheless, although the new constituional language does not indicate
the restrictions upon the freedoms currently exercised under its aus-
pices, it does symbolize that there has been an important change from
what is now viewed as the tyranny of the "gang of four."
CONCLUSION
What can we conclude about the latest in the fundamental charters
spawned by China in the 20th century? Our examination of three of its
principal aspects suggests that it is a halfway house between the 1975
document on the left and the 1954 document on the right. Although
the Party line since the overthrow of the "gang of four" has repudiated
many of the policies that prevailed at the time the 1975 constitution
was adopted and has returned to many policies of the mid-1950s, the
new constitution has not gone as far as that shift might lead one to
anticipate in repudiating the changes made in 1975 and returning to the
1954 version. Its property provisions are similar to those of 1975. It
restores only some of the institutional restraints upon the exercise of
executive power that had been established on paper and in a few in-
stances had shown possibilities of realization. And it does surprisingly
little to enhance the substantive protections of individuals in their rela-
tion to the state.
Yet is the document a mere paper charade undeserving of our at-
tention? I think not, for it serves a number of significant functions in
the Chinese political-legal system. One of these is to legitimize the
post-Mao regime at home and abroad and to confirm in ideological
and organizational terms both the present government's continuity with
the first generation of the People's Republic and the major changes in
the polity, economy, and society that occurred during that period.
With greater credibility than its predecessor, it serves as a symbol of the
national unity that the revitalized Party hopes to forge after the bitter
upheavals of the recent past. It also symbolizes some significant
changes in specific policies. Furthermore, the new constitution recites,
albeit vaguely, the goals of the regime. As Yeh Chien-ying stated, it
lays down in legal form "the general task for the whole nation in the
new period as set forth at the Eleventh National Congress of the Com-
munist Party .... ,232
232 Id. at 179.
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The value of a constitution to the People's Republic lies in more
than its symbolism, of course. It actually prescribes the formal alloca-
tion of power within the government and the relation of the govern-
ment to both the Party and the people. To speak only of obvious
illustrations, by authoritatively establishing that the Party is in com-
mand of the state machine, that the office of chairman of the People's
Republic no longer exists, that the chairman of the Party commands
the armed forces, that the executive is to be subject only to certain
modest checks by the legislative, judicial, and procuratorial organs,
that various human rights are recognized but others are not, and that
certain individualistic property relations are to be tolerated during the
current phase of socialism, the constitution actually performs a service,
offering a formal basis for the orderly conduct of Chinese government.
Yet a People's Republic of China constitutiohi is not what the west-
ern liberal tradition would call a constitution. Like its counterparts in
other communist states, it is a formalization of existing power configu-
rations rather than an authentic institutional framework for adjusting
relations between the political forces that compete for power in a dy-
namic relationship.233 Indeed, this was even more true of the 1975 con-
stitution than of its counterparts in other communist states because it
shrivelled the powers that its more conventional 1954 predecessor pur-
ported to confer upon the National People's Congress, the judiciary,
and the procuracy.
The 1975 arrangement was based on the premise that the political
process should not entail independent roles for the legislature, the
courts, and the procuracy but instead should be confined within the
Communist Party and the government administration that executes the
Party's will. Is the new document very different? Plainly, the institu-
tions and processes that it establishes will not determine the most im-
portant questions of political power, such as who will be the next
chairman of the Party and therefore commander of the armed forces
and militia. Nor will they make the final decisions about the country's
policies regarding economic development, education, decentralization
of authority, human rights, foreign policy, and a host of other challeng-
ing problems. For that, one still has to look not to the state machine
but to the Party, whose most recent charter, adopted in 1977, itself does
little more than confer decision-making powers on the Central Com-
mittee's Political Bureau and the Political Bureau's Standing Commit-
233 See Lowenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in our Revolutionary Age, in CON-




tee.234 Ultimately one must seek clues to the crucial operations of the
political process not in any documents-published or perhaps even in-
ternal-but in murky and uncertain customary practices and expecta-
tions that must surely be as fascinating as they are secret.
In many ways this Chinese Communist experience echoes China's
constitutional experience under Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party,
the Kuomintang, both before and after its flight to Taiwan. The Provi-
sional Constitution of 1931, we should recall, largely confirmed the ex-
isting political arrangements according to which the Kuomintang
controlled all government agencies. Similarly, the impressive 1946
Constitution of the Republic of China, although more significant than
the 1975 Constitution of the People's Republic in the extent to which it
regulates the exercise of governmental power, has been precluded by
the continuing application of martial law from substantially altering
the Kuomintang's dictatorial rule and making the government, rather
than the Kuomintang, the arena in which major political forces are ad-
justed. In Taiwan legislative bodies have begun to play an increasingly
important role in the political system in recent years, especially at the
local level. Yet it is still true that in both the People's Republic of
China and Taiwan, after a generation of rivalry between the state sys-
tems of the competing elites, the organization and management of the
party remain more important than the structure and processes of the
government.
Like the Kuomintang during the 1930's and 1940's, China's com-
munist leaders have had divided, ambivalent, and changing attitudes
towards western-style constitutionalism. Whatever their views, they
have all invoked the mantle of Mao Tse-tung, sometimes even while
opposing his policies, just as republican leaders generally claimed to be
faithful to the "Three People's Principles" of Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun, we
should remember, believed in the necessity of a period of political tute-
lage during which the Kuomintang would justifiably control the gov-
ernment until the Chinese people were ready to practice parliamentary
democracy.235 This was his way of bridging the gap between current
realities and constitutional aspirations. His successor, Chiang Kai-
shek, ultimately succumbed to pressure for a constitution, but he
bridged the gap by using martial law to suspend the execution of those
234 See PARTY CONSTITUTION, supra note 178, chs. 2-3. For a fascinating, groundbreaking
study of the Politburo processes, see K. LIEFERT, CENTRAL DOCUMENTS AND POLITBURO POLIT-
ICS OF CHINA (1978).
235 See Sun Yat-sen's Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1924), reprinted in CH'IEN,
supra note 7, at 462. But see H. SCHIFFRING, SUN YAT-SEN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE
REVOLUTION 360 (1968).
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provisions that were inconvenient to unfettered rule.236
Mao justified an era of communist "dictatorship of the proletariat"
as a temporary necessity until the people are ready to practice true
communism. The advent of communism, of course, will not introduce
western-style constitutional government but the mysterious withering
away of the state, eliminating the need for a government constitution or
even a government. Although the Nationalists and the Communists
thus have distinctive ideologies and claim to be moving in directions
that have profoundly differing implications for constitutionalism, one
has to remain skeptical about the likelihood that either regime will
abandon rule by party-military dictatorship in the foreseeable future.
The Communists, as well as the Nationalists, have made some pro-
gress in the search for autochthonous Chinese norms and forms that
can be briefly and simply described in a manner intelligible to the peo-
ple. The 1946 republican constitution reflected the desire to build in
part upon traditional Chinese institutions by creating the control and
examination branches of government. To a much lesser extent it re-
sponded to the felt need for a brief, simple, non-legalistic charter of
government. The 1975 Constitution of the People's Republic clearly
met the latter need and was the most intelligible document of its kind
the Chinese people had even seen, being also much simpler and shorter
than counterparts in other communist states. Moreover, it was a more
authentic constitutional product than others that had emerged in twen-
tieth century China. Although it eliminated the procuracy, the descen-
dant of the traditional Chinese censorate, as well as a counterpart to the
Soveit procuracy, it did so as part of a plan that established the most
monolithic, formally unchecked bureaucratic power since the fall of the
Manchus. This bureaucracy was to be presided over by a single ruler,
not an emperor but the Party chairman, who was to be aided by a small
elite, not the aristocracy but the higher echelons in the Party.
To put it another way, in 1975 the Party narrowed the gap that has
existed between modem China's constitutions and the reality of a per-
sonalized party-military dictatorship. Yet the Party did not have the
temerity to end the gap and emulate the rulers of imperial China by
matching the forms of governmental power to contemporary realities.
The 1975 version, although rather different from its 1954 predecessor
and the Soviet model, still contained a good measure of Soviet and
even western values and institutions in its forms and standards of gov-
ernment.
236 See H.R. IsAAcs, THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 295-98 (1961).
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The new constitution, although composed of twice as many arti-
cles as its predecessor, is not noticeably less simple, and it does not
approach the 1954 document in either length or complexity. In bring-
ing back the procuracy, it strengthens the system's Chinese character as
much as its Soviet character, yet without purporting to establish a suffi-
cient number of institutional or substantive checks upon the executive
to alter the monolithic nature of the state machine. Thus, by not very
substantially going beyond its predecessor in asserting foreign princi-
ples, it does not significantly widen the gap.
Can we anticipate the course of future constitutional development
in the People's Republic? Will the gap be closed by eliminating what
remains of the western-Soviet constitutional window-dressing? Or
might the gap be narrowed not by doing away with existing constitu-
tional forms and norms but by gradually developing respect for them
among the Party and the people? The 1975 constitution was short-lived
because the profound political instability, created by a badly divided
political leadership confronting its gravest crisis-the question of
Mao's succession-could not endure. Obviously the outcome of that
struggle was not importantly influenced by the government constitution
or even the Party charter. The fate of the 1978 constitution will rest
upon the extent to which the current leaders can prevent factionalism
from again degenerating into open political combat as well as upon the
degree of their success in protecting, feeding, clothing, housing, or-
ganizing, educating, and modernizing a population that may reach two
billion by the year 2025. A more united and a more comfortable, mod-
em, and sophisticated Party and people may eventually demonstrate a
greater appreciation of institutional and substantive restraints upon
government and begin to breathe life into some of those in the new
constitution. A key factor will be the willingness of Party leaders to
allow the various government agencies-not merely the executive-to
assume principal responsibility for day to day government operations
and to focus the Party on policy-making, as in the Leninist conception.
Even now it is not impossible that the present constitutional insti-
tutions, norms, and values may give rise to practices and expectations
that will develop authentic roots in China's political culture. It is con-
ceivable, for example, that the rights to strike and to put up big-charac-
ter posters may turn out to be more than tools to be manipulated in the
intra-Party struggle. Such actions have sometimes been the vehicles of
genuine, spontaneous protest.237 Endowing them with constitutional
237 See, e.g., Peking Wall PostersAppeal Cases to Authorities, Paris AFP, April 21, 1978, sum-
marizedin FBIS-CHI-78-79, April 24, 1978, at F19.
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legitimacy raises the political cost to the authorities of suppressing
them, just as eliminating the rights to carry on private correspondence
and to change residence deprives one of useful and occasionally per-
suasive political argumentation in support of those practices.
A similar evolution may occur as a result of continuing constitu-
tional protection of other actions that have occasionally proved fruitful,
such as filing complaints and appeals against illegal acts by state offi-
cials and others. The current campaign to condemn the "gang of four"
and rehabilitate their many victims not only reinforces public outrage
against the "gang's" violations of the person and suppression of free-
dom but also heightens public awareness of the possibility and desira-
bility of vindicating human rights through these mechanisms.
We must also realize that this campaign itself-like the 1978 con-
stitution and the plans to develop a formal legal system238-is an im-
portant part of the Party's response to the widely felt need to curb the
long night of arbitrary rule. Although the Chinese political-legal tradi-
tion is very different from that of the western industrial democracies, it
turns out that Chinese-not only intellectuals but also many less well-
educated people-share with the outside world a common sense of in-
justice and would like their government to observe minimum standards
of fundamental decency in dealing with them. The current leaders are
seeking to meet this demand for greater personal security because they
realize that it is essential to restore the morale, enthusiasm, and produc-
tivity of the articulate segments of the nation if they are to fulfill their
ambition to make China a modem, powerful industrial state. So long
as fear of arbitrary action persists, one cannot expect officials to take
bold initiatives, scientists to innovate, teachers to present new ideas,
and workers frankly to criticize bureaucracy. The new leaders have
recognized that the relationship between economic development and
individual rights is not an either/or proposition and that certain mini-
mum guarantees of individual rights are necessary to promote develop-
ment at China's present stage. Thus it is possible that certain types of
"due process" protections may evolve in China even though other west-
ern constitutional values such as representative democracy and full
freedoms of political expression may not.239
To be sure, it was easier to adopt an optimistic perspective during
the original constitutional era of 1954-1957, especially during the Hun-
dred Flowers period when frequent invocation and elucidation of con-
238 See Cohen, Will China Have a Formal Legal System?, 64 A.B.A. J. 1510 (1978).
239 See Cohen, Due Process in China?, in How DIFFERENT IS CHINA? (R. Terrill ed. forthcom-
ing); Cohen, Human Rights in China, Wash. Post, April 23, 1978, at D2, col. 1.
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stitutional provisions made the growth of constitutionalism seem
conceivable if not likely. The dashing of those hopes, the experiences
of two subsequent decades and the 1978 constitution's failure to restore
some important aspects of the 1954 system suggest that, despite recent
modest changes, it will be a very long time before the Chinese take
western-style constitutionalism as seriously as politics.
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APPENDIX
Constitution of the People's Republic of China (adopted March 5, 1978)
PREAMBLE
After more than a century of heroic struggle the Chinese people, led by the Communist Party
of China headed by our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, finally overthrew the
reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism by means of people's revolu-
tionary war, winning complete victory in the new-democratic revolution, and in 1949 founded the
People's Republic of China.
The founding of the People's Republic of China marked the beginning of the historical pe-
riod of socialism in our country. Since then, under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the
Chinese Communist Party, the people of all our nationalities have carried out Chairman Mao's
proletarian revolutionary line in the political, economic, cultural and military fields and in foreign
affairs and have won great victories in socialist revolution and socialist construction through re-
peated struggles against enemies both at home and abroad and through the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution. The dictatorship of the proletariat in our country has been consolidated and
strengthened, and China has become a socialist country with the beginnings of prosperity.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung was the founder of the People's Republic of China. All our victories
in revolution and construction have been won under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Tse-tung Thought. The fundamental guarantee that the people of all our nationalities will strug-
gle in unity and carry the proletarian revolution through to the end is always to hold high and
staunchly to defend the great banner of Chairman Mao.
The triumphant conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has ushered in
a new period of development in China's socialist revolution and socialist construction. In accord-
ance with the basic line of the Chinese Communist Party for the entire historical period of social-
ism, the general task for the people of the whole country in this new period is: To persevere in
continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, carry forward the three great
revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment,
and make China a great and powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, industry, na-
tional defense and science and technology by the end of the century.
We must persevere in the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and in the strug-
gle for the socialist road against the capitalist road. We must oppose revisionism and prevent the
restoration of capitalism. We must be prepared to deal with subversion and aggression against
our country by social-imperialism and imperialism.
We should consolidate and expand the revolutionary united front which is led by the working
class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, and which unites the large numbers of intellectu-
als and other working people, patriotic democratic parties, patriotic personages, our compatriots
in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and our countrymen residing abroad. We should enhance the
great unity of all the nationalities in our country. We should correctly distinguish and handle the
contradictions among the people and those between ourselves and the enemy. We should en-
deavor to create among the people of the whole country a political situation in which there are
both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease
of mind and liveliness, so as to help bring all positive factors into play, overcome all difficulties,
better consolidate the proletarian dictatorship and build up our country more rapidly.
Taiwan is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan and accomplish
the great cause of unifying our motherland.
In international affairs, we should establish and develop relations with other countries on the
basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence. Our country will never seek hegemony, or strive to be a superpower. We
should uphold proletariat internationalism. In accordance with the theory of the three worlds, we
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should strengthen our unity with the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations throughout
the world, the socialist countries, and the third world countries, and we should unite with all
countries subjected to aggression, subversion, interference, control and bullying by the social-
imperialist and imperialist superpowers to form the broadest possible international united front
against the hegemonism of the superpowers and against a new world war, and strive for the pro-
gress and emancipation of humanity.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article I The People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
Article 2 The Communist Party of China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese
people. The working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard, the Commu-
nist Party of China.
The guiding ideology of the People's Republic of China is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung
Thought.
Article 3 All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs
through which the people exercise state power are the National People's Congress and the local
people's congresses at various levels.
The National People's Congress, the local people's congresses at various levels and all other
organs of state practice democratic centralism.
Article 4 The People's Republic of China is a unitary multinational state.
All the nationalities are equal. There should be unity and fraternal love among the nationali-
ties and they should help and learn from each other. Discrimination against, or oppression of, any
nationality, and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities are prohibited. Big-national-
ity chauvinism and local-nationality chauvinism must be opposed.
All the nationalities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written lan-
guages, and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways.
Regional autonomy applies in an area where a minority nationality lives in a compact com-
munity. All the national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of
China.
Article 5 There are mainly two kinds of ownership of the means of production in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China at the present stage: socialist ownership by the whole people and socialist
collective ownership by the working people.
The state allows non-agricultural individual laborers to engage in individual labor involving
no exploitation of others, within the limits permitted by law and under unified arrangement and
management by organizations at the basic level in cities and towns or in rural areas. At the same
time, it guides these individual laborers step by step on to the road of socialist collectivization.
Article 6 The state sector of the economy, that is, the socialist sector owned by the whole
people, is the leading force in the national economy.
Mineral resources, waters and those forests, undeveloped lands and other marine and land
resources owned by the state are the property of the whole people.
The state may requisition by purchase, take over for use, or nationalize land under conditions
prescribed by law.
Article 7 The rural people's commune sector of the economy is a socialist sector collectively
owned by the masses of working people. At present, it generally takes the form of three-level
ownership, that is, ownership by the commune, the production brigade and the production team,
with the production team as the basic accounting unit. A production brigade may become the
basic accounting unit when its conditions are ripe.
Provided that the absolute predominance of the collective economy of the people's commune
is ensured, commune members may farm small plots of land for personal needs, engage in limited
household sideline production, and in pastoral areas they may also keep a limited number of
livestock for personal needs.
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Article 8 Socialist public property shall be inviolable. The state ensures the consolidation
and development of the socialist sector of the economy owned by the whole people and of the
socialist sector collectively owned by the masses of working people.
The state prohibits any person from using any means whatsoever to disrupt the economic
order of the society, undermine the economic plans of the state, encroach upon or squander state
and collective property, or injure the public interest.
Article 9 The state protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings,
houses and other means of livelihood.
Article 10 The state applies the socialist principles: "He who does not work, neither shall he
eat" and "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."
Work is an honorable duty for every citizen able to work. The state promotes socialist labor
emulation, and, putting proletarian politics in command, it applies the policy of combining moral
encouragement with material reward, with the stress on the former, in order to heighten the citi-
zens' socialist enthusiasm and creativeness in work.
Article 11 The state adheres to the general line of going all out, aiming high and achieving
greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism, it undertakes the
planned, proportionate and high-speed development of the national economy, and it continuously
develops the productive forces, so as to consolidate the country's independence and security and
improve the people's material and cultural life step by step.
In developing the national economy, the state adheres to the principle of building our country
independently, with the initiative in our own hands and through self-reliance, hard struggle, dili-
gence and thrift, it adheres to the principle of taking agriculture as the foundation and industry as
the leading factor, and it adheres to the principle of bringing the initiative of both the central and
local authorities into full play under the unified leadership of the central authorities.
The state protects the environment and natural resources and prevents and eliminates pollu-
tion and other hazards to the public.
Article 12 The state devotes major efforts to developing science, expands scientific research,
promotes technical innovation and technical revolution and adopts advanced techniques wherever
possible in all departments of the national economy. In scientific and technological work we must
follow the practice of combining professional contingents with the masses, and combining learn-
ing from others with our own creative efforts.
Article 13 The state devotes major efforts to developing education in order to raise the cul-
tural and scientific level of the whole nation. Education must serve proletarian politics and be
combined with productive labor and must enable everyone who receives an education to develop
morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and
culture.
Article 14 The state upholds the leading position of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung
Thought in all spheres of ideology and culture. All cultural undertakings must serve the workers,
peasants and soldiers and serve socialism.
The state applies the policy of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of
thought contend" so as to promote the development of the arts and sciences and bring about a
flourishing socialist culture.
Article 15 All organs of state must constantly maintain close contact with the masses of the
people, rely on them, heed their opinions, be concerned for their weal and woe, streamline admin-
istration, practice economy, raise efficiency and combat bureaucracy.
The leading personnel of state organs at all levels must conform to the requirements for
successors in the proletarian revolutionary cause and their composition must conform to the prin-
ciple of the three-in-one combination of the old, the middle-aged and the young.
Article 16 The personnel of organs of state must earnestly study Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Tse-tung Thought, wholeheartedly serve the people, endeavor to perfect their professional compe-
tence, take an active part in collective productive labor, accept supervision by the masses, be
models in observing the Constitution and the law, correctly implement the policies of the state,
China's Changing Constitution
1:57(1979)
seek the truth from facts, and must not have recourse to deception or exploit their position and
power to seek personal gain.
Article 17 The state adheres to the principle of socialist democracy, and ensures to the peo-
ple the right to participate in the management of state affairs and of all economic and cultural
undertakings, and the right to supervise the organs of state and their personnel.
Article 18 The state safeguards the socialist system, suppresses all treasonable and counter-
revolutionary activities, punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries, and punishes newborn
bourgeois elements and other bad elements.
The state deprives of political rights, as prescribed by law, those landlords, rich peasants and
reactionary capitalists who have not yet been reformed, and at the same time it provides them
with the opportunity to earn a living so that they may be reformed through labor and become law-
abiding citizens supporting themselves by their own labor.
Article 19 The Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China com-
mands the armed forces of the People's Republic of China.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army is the workers' and peasants' own armed force led by
the Communist Party of China; it is the pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The state
devotes major efforts to the revolutionization and modernization of the Chinese People's Libera-
tion Army, strengthens the building of the militia and adopts a system under which our armed
forces are a combination of the field armies, the regional forces and the militia.
The fundamental task of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China is: To safeguard
the socialist revolution and socialist construction, to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and security of the state, and to guard against subversion and aggression by social-imperialism,
imperialism and their lackeys.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE
The National People's Congress
Article 20 The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power.
Article 21 The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by the people's
congresses of the provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central
Government, and by the People's Liberation Army. The deputies should be elected by secret
ballot after democratic consultation.
The National People's Congress is elected for a term of five years. Under special circum-
stances, its term of office may be extended or the succeeding National People's Congress may be
convened before its due date.
The National People's Congress holds one session each year. When necessary, the session
may be advanced or postponed.
Article 22 The National People's Congress exercises the following functions and powers:
(I) to amend the Constitution;
(2) to make laws;
(3) to supervise the enforcement of the Constitution and the law;
(4) to decide on the choice of the Premier of the State Council upon the recommendation
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China;
(5) to decide on the choice of other members of the State Council upon the recommenda-
tion of the Premier of the State Council;
(6) to elect the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief Procurator of the
Supreme People's Procuracy;
(7) to examine and approve the national economic plan, the state budget and the final state
accounts;
(8) to confirm the following administrative divisions: provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities directly under the Central Government;
(9) to decide on questions of war and peace; and
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(10) to exercise such other functions and powers as the National People's Congress deems
necessary.
Article 23 The National People's Congress has the power to remove from office the mem-
bers of the State Council, the President of the Supreme People's Court and the Chief Procurator of
the Supreme People's Procuracy.
Article 24 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is the permanent
organ of the National People's Congress. It is responsible and accountable to the National Peo-
ple's Congress.






The National People's Congress elects the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress and has the power to recall its members.
Article 25 The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the follow-
ing functions and powers:
(1) to conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress;
(2) to convene the sessions of the National People's Congress;
(3) to interpret the Constitution and laws and to enact decrees;
(4) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the
Supreme People's Procuracy;
(5) to change and annul inappropriate decisions adopted by the organs of state power of
provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government;
(6) to decide on the appointment and removal of individual members of the State Council
upon the recommendation of the Premier of the State Council when the National People's Con-
gress is not in session;
(7) to appoint and remove Vice-Presidents of the Supreme People's Court and Deputy
Chief Procurators of the Supreme People's Procuracy;
(8) to decide on the appointment and removal of plenipotentiary representatives abroad;
(9) to decide on the ratification and abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states;
(10) to institute state titles of honor and decide on their conferment;
(II) to decide on the granting of pardons;
(12) to decide on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the
country when the National People's Congress is not in session; and
(13) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's
Congress.
Article 26 The Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
presides over the work of the Standing Committee; receives foreign diplomatic envoys; and in
accordance with the decisions of the National People's Congress or its Standing Committee
promulgates laws and decrees, dispatches and recalls plenipotentiary representatives abroad, rati-
fies treaties concluded with foreign states and confers state titles of honor.
The Vice-Chairmen of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress assist the
Chairman in his work and may exercise part of the Chairman's functions and powers on his
behalf.
Article 27 The National People's Congress and its Standing Committee may establish spe-
cial committees as deemed necessary.
Article 28 Deputies to the National People's Congress have the right to address inquiries to
the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuracy, and the minis-
tries and commissions of the State Council, which are all under obligation to answer.
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Article 29 Deputies to the National People's Congress are subject to supervision by the units
which elect them. These electoral units have the power to replace at any time the deputies they
elect, as prescribed by law.
The State Council
Article 30 The State Council is the Central People's Government and the executive organ of
the highest organ of state power, it is the highest organ of state administration.
The State Council is responsible and accountable to the National People's'Congress, or, when
the National People's Congress is not in session, to its Standing Committee.




the ministers heading the commissions.
The Premier presides over the work of the State Council and the Vice-Premiers assist the
Premier in his work.
Article 32 The State Council exercises the following functions and powers:
(I) to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders and verify their execu-
tion, in accordance with the Constitution, laws and decrees;
(2) to submit proposals on laws and other matters to the National People's Congress or its
Standing Committee;
(3) to exercise unified leadership over the work of the ministries and commissions and other
organizations under it;
(4) to exercise unified leadership over the work of local organs of state administration at
various levels throughout the country;
(5) to draw up and put into effect the national economic plan and the state budget;
(6) to protect the interests of the state, maintain public order and safeguard the rights of
citizens;
(7) to confirm the following administrative divisions: autonomous prefectures, counties, au-
tonomous counties, and cities;
(8) to appoint and remove administrative personnel according to the provisions of the law;
and
(9) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's
Congress or its Standing Committee.
The Local People's Congresses And the Local Revolutionary Committees at Various Levels
Article 33 The administrative division of the People's Republic of China is as follows:
(1) The country is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly
under the Central Government;
(2) Provinces and autonomous regions are divided into autonomous prefectures, counties,
autonomous counties, and cities; and
(3) Counties and autonomous counties are divided into people's communes and towns.
Municipalities directly under the Central Government and other large cities are divided into
districts and counties. Autonomous prefectures are divided into counties, autonomous counties,
and cities.
Autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties are all national au-
tonomous areas.
Article 34 People's congresses and revolutionary committees are established in provinces,
municipalities directly under the Central Government, counties, cities, municipal districts, peo-
ple's communes and towns.
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People's congresses and revolutionary committees of the people's communes are organiza-
tions of political power at the grass-roots level, and are also leading organs of collective economy.
Revolutionary committees at the provincial level may establish administrative offices as their
agencies in prefectures.
Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures
and autonomous counties.
Article 35 Local people's congresses at various levels are local organs of state power.
Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the Central
Government, counties, and cities divided into districts are elected by people's congresses at the
next lower level by secret ballot after democratic consultation; deputies to the people's congresses
of cities not divided into districts, and of municipal districts, people's communes and towns are
directly elected by the voters by secret ballot after democratic consultation.
The people's congresses of provinces and municipalities directly under the Central Govern-
ment are elected for a term of five years. The people's congresses of counties, cities and municipal
districts are elected for a term of three years. The people's congresses of people's communes and
towns are elected for a term of two years.
Local people's congresses at various levels hold at least one session each year, which is to be
convened by revolutionary committees at the corresponding levels.
The units and electorates which elect the deputies to the local people's congresses at various
levels have the power to supervise, remove and replace their deputies at any time according to the
provisions of the law.
Article 36 Local people's congresses at various levels, in their respective administrative ar-
eas, ensure the observance and enforcement of the Constitution, laws and decrees; ensure the
implementation of the state plan; make plans for local economic and cultural development and for
public utilities; examine and approve local economic plans, budgets and final accounts; protect
public property; maintain public order, safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal rights of
minority nationalities; and promote the development of socialist revolution and socialist construc-
tion.
Local people's congresses may adopt and issue decisions within the limits of their authority as
prescribed by law.
Local people's congresses elect, and have the power to recall, members of revolutionary com-
mittees at the corresponding levels. People's congresses at county level and above elect, and have
the power to recall, the presidents of the people's courts and the chief procurators of the people's
procuracies at the corresponding levels.
Deputies to local people's congresses at various levels have the right to address inquiries to
the revolutionary committees, people's courts, people's procuracies and organs under the revolu-
tionary committees at the corresponding levels, which are all under obligation to answer.
Article 37 Local revolutionary committees of various levels, that is, local people's govern-
ments, are the executive organs of local people's congresses at the corresponding levels and they
are also local organs of state administration.
A local revolutionary committee is composed of a chairman, vice-chairmen and other mem-
bers.
Local revolutionary committees carry out the decisions of people's congresses at the corre-
sponding levels as well as the decisions and orders of the organs of state administration at higher
levels, direct the administrative work of their respective areas, and issue decisions and orders
within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law. Revolutionary committees at county level
and above appoint or remove the personnel of organs of state according to the provisions of the
law.
Local revolutionary committees are responsible and accountable to people's congresses at the
corresponding levels and to the organs of state administration at the next higher level, and work
under the unified leadership of the State Council.
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The Organs of Self-Government of National Autonomous Areas
Article 38 The organs of self-government of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures
and autonomous counties are people's congresses and revolutionary committees.
The election of the people's congresses and revolutionary committees of national autonomous
areas, their terms of office, their functions and powers and also the establishment of their agencies
should conform to the basic principles governing the organization of local organs of state as speci-
fied in Section III, Chapter Two, of the Constitution.
In autonomous areas where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is enti-
tled to appropriate representation in the organs of self-government.
Article 39 The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas exercise autonomy
within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, in addition to exercising the functions and
powers of local organs of state as specified by the Constitution.
The organs of self-government of national autonomous areas may, in the light of the political,
economic and cultural characteristics of the nationality or nationalities in a given area, make
regulations on the exercise of autonomy and also specific regulations and submit them to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval.
In performing their functions, the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas
employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used by the nationality or na-
tionalities in the locality.
Article 40 The higher organs of state shall fully safeguard the exercise of autonomy by the
organs of self-government of national autonomous areas, take into full consideration the charac-
teristics and needs of the various minority nationalities, make a major effort to train cadres of the
minority nationalities, and actively support and assist all the minority nationalities in their social-
ist revolution and construction and thus advance their socialist economic and cultural develop-
ment.
The People's Courts and the People's Procuracies
Article 41 The Supreme People's Court, local people's courts at various levels and special
people's courts exercise judicial authority. The people's courts are formed as prescribed by law.
In accordance with law, the people's courts apply the system whereby representatives of the
masses participate as assessors in administering justice. With regard to major counter-revolution-
ary or criminal cases, the masses should be drawn in for discussion and suggestions.
All cases in the people's courts are heard in public except those involving special circum-
stances, as prescribed by law. The accused has the right to defense.
Article 42 The Supreme People's Court is the highest judicial organ.
The Supreme People's Court supervises the administration of justice by local people's courts
at various levels and by special people's courts; people's courts at the higher levels supervise the
administration of justice by people's courts at the lower levels.
The Supreme People's Court is responsible and accountable to the National People's Con-
gress and its Standing Committee. Local people's courts at various levels are responsible and
accountable to local people's congresses at the corresponding levels.
Article 43 The Supreme People's Procuracy exercises procuratorial authority to ensure ob-
servance of the Constitution and the law by all the departments under the State Council, the local
organs of state at various levels, the personnel of organs of state and the citizens. Local people's
procuracies and special people's procuracies exercise procuratorial authority within the limits pre-
scribed by law. The people's procuracies are formed as prescribed by law.
The Supreme People's Procuracy supervises the work of local people's procuracies at various
levels and of special people's procuracies; people's procuracies at the higher levels supervise the
work of those at the lower levels.
The Supreme People's Procuracy is responsible and accountable to the National People's
Congress and its Standing Committee. Local people's procuracies at various levels are responsible
and accountable to people's congresses at the corresponding levels.
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THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS
Article 44 All citizens who have reached the age of 18 have the right to vote and to stand for
election, with the exception of persons deprived of these rights by law.
Article 45 Citizens enjoy freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, assembly, associa-
tion, procession, demonstration and the freedom to strike, and have the right to "speak out freely,
air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters."
Article 46 Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in reli-
gion and to propagate atheism. "
Article 47 The citizens' freedom of person and their homes are inviolable.
No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people's court or with the sanction of a
people's procuracy, and the arrest must be made by a public security organ.
Article 48 Citizens have the right to work. To ensure that citizens enjoy this right, the state
provides employment in accordance with the principle of overall consideration, and, on the basis
of increased production, the state gradually increases payment for labor, improves working condi-
tions, strengthens labor protection and expands collective welfare.
Article 49 Working people have the right to rest. To ensure that working people enjoy this
right, the state prescribes working hours and systems of vacations and gradually expands material
facilities for the working people to rest and recuperate.
Article 50 Working people have the right to material assistance in old age, and in case of
illness or disability. To ensure that working people enjoy this right, the state gradually expands
social insurance, social assistance, public health services, co-operative medical services, and other
services.
The state cares for and ensures the livelihood of disabled revolutionary armymen and the
families of revolutionary martyrs.
Article 51 Citizens have the right to education. To ensure that citizens enjoy this right, the
state gradually increases the number of schools of various types and of other cultural and educa-
tional institutions and popularizes education.
The state pays special attention to the healthy development of young people and children.
Article 52 Citizens have the freedom to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic
creation and other cultural activities. The state encourages and assists the creative endeavors of
citizens engaged in science, education, literature, art, journalism, publishing, public health, sports
and other cultural work.
Article 53 Women enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of political, economic, cul-
tural, social and family life. Men and women enjoy equal pay for equal work.
Men and women shall marry of their own free will. The state protects marriage, the family,
and the mother and child.
The state advocates and encourages family planning.
Article 54 The state protects the just rights and interests of overseas Chinese and their rela-
tives.
Article 55 Citizens have the right to lodge complaints with organs of state at any level
against any person working in an organ of state, enterprise or institution for transgression of law
or neglect of duty. Citizens have the right to appeal to organs of state at any level against any
infringement of their rights. No one shall suppress such complaints and appeals or retaliate
against persons making them.
Article 56 Citizens must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China, support
the socialist system, safeguard the unification of the motherland and the unity of all nationalities
in our country and abide by the Constitution and the law.
Article 57 Citizens must take care of and protect public property, observe labor discipline,
observe public order, respect social ethics and safeguard state secrets.
Article 58 It is the lofty duty of every citizen to defend the motherland and resist aggression.
It is the honorable obligation of citizens to perform military service and to join the militia
according to the law.
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Article 59 The People's Republic of China grants the right of residence to any foreign na-
tional persecuted for supporting a just cause, for taking part in revolutionary movements or for
engaging in scientific work.
THE NATIONAL FLAG, THE NATIONAL EMBLEM AND THE CAPITAL
Article 60 The national flag of the People's Republic of China has five stars on a field of
red.
The national emblem of the People's Republic of China is: Tien An Men in the centre,
illuminated by five stars and encircled by ears of grain and a cogwheel.
The capital of the People's Republic of China is Peking.
